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PREFACE

After years of planning and preparation, Delta Nu Alpha
Transportation Fraternity has published the lournal of Transportation
Management. The Journal's focus is on transportation and
transportation related subjects with a practitioner oriented flavor.
There are too many people to thank individually. However, we
offer a special thanks to those members of DNA who have supported
our belief that this Journal is an important educational tool for both
the practitioner and academician. Your encouragement and your
financial support is appreciated. DNA's elected officers, who had the
foresight and patience to bring this project to fruition, must also be
recognized.
We firmly believe that education in our industry can be
accomplished in a variety of methods such as seminars, workshops,
conferences, and newsletters. Delta Nu Alpha Transportation
Fraternity is proving yet another important method to meet our
educational objectives - The Journal of Transportation Management

David J. Bloomberg, Ph D.
Jerry R. Foster, Ph.D.
Co-Editors,
lournal of Transportation Management

LINER SHIPPING AND THE U.S. INTERNATIONAL TRADES
by
Fredrick M. Collison, Ph.D.
University of Hawaii at Manoa

INTRODUCTION
Over the past few years liner shipping has undergone a number
of changes which have been particularly important in the U.S.
international trades. These changes have affected shipping lines,
shippers, consignees, and intermediaries, who have had to modify
the way in which they operate in order to be successful. This article
will discuss some of the more important changes that have taken
place, the impact that they have had on the industry, and what this
means for shipping lines and their customers.1
The international liner industry serving the U.S. consists of two
types of shipping lines - conference lines and independents, with
both regulated economically by the Federal Maritime Commission
(FMC). Conference lines belong to voluntary organizations, whose
members jointly agree on the rates to be charged and the services to
be provided by member lines, and may include the determination of
sailing schedules and ports of call.2 A number of these Conferences
are found in the U.S. trades and are given anti-trust immunity to
make these joint decisions regarding rates and service. Conferences
in the U.S. trades are required to be "open," which means that any
line wishing to join cannot be arbitrarily denied membership.
Independent lines operate outside the conference system making
management decisions on an individual basis and frequently com
peting against the conference lines.
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Among the recent and continuing changes that have affected the
international liner industry in the U.S. trades are:
*

implementation of the Shipping Act of 19843;

*

passage of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of
19884;

*

increased development and sophistication of intermodal
services;

*

evolution of round-the-world services;

*

overcapacity on many U.S. international trade routes.

These changes represent both problems and opportunities for both
shipping lines and their customers. Those who adapt to these
changes will be successful. The following sections highlight the most
prominent features of these changes and the impacts that they have
had on the U.S. international liner trades.

RECENT U.S. SHIPPING LEGISLATION
Shipping Act of 1984
The Shipping Act of 1984 has resulted in a number of major
changes in U.S. international iiner shipping. This legislation took a
somewhat different direction than did most other contemporary
legislation that dealt with economic regulation of transportation.
While nearly all other legislation of the last decade resulted in some
form of deregulation, the Shipping Act of 1984 seemed to increase
liner shipping's exemption from anti-trust considerations.5 At the
same time, however, the power of shippers in relation to liner con
ference operators was also increased.

2
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Since the Shipping Act of 1984 is quite comprehensive, only the
most relevant provisions will be dealt with here.6 These are:
* A clear authority for conferences and their shipping line
members to offer intermodal rates and services;
* The right for individual conference members to take
independent action on 10-days' notice on any rate or service
action required to be filed in a tariff;
* Service contracts with specific rate schedules and service
guarantees may be negotiated in which a shipper commits a
minimum amount of cargo over a specified period of time,
with independent action on service contracts only available to
conference member lines when the conference permits;
* Carriers or conferences are prohibited from refusing to deal
with shipper associations.
The above provisions created a number of changes in the relation
ships between shipping lines and their customers. The first three
provisions listed above resulted in much more flexibility in the
negotiation of rate and service changes on the part of the liner
conferences and their individual member lines serving the United
States.
The provision of the Act which permitted conferences and their
members to offer intermodal service has been quite important,
because there had been legal questions about conference authority
in this area. Prior to 1984, shipping line conferences were hesitant
to establish intermodal services for fear of violating U.S. antitrust law.
As a result of the Shipping Act's intermodal provisions, the number
of intermodal services have increased dramatically, as discussed
below. In order to preserve the prevailing environment of domestic
transportation regulation, however, the Act specified that overland
rates and terms of service by rail or highway were required to be
individually negotiated between a shipping line and an overland
carrier.
Volume I, Number I
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The use of service contracts between shippers and conferences/
individual shipping lines has become an important result of the
Shipping Act. A service contract provides a vehicle for negotiating
transportation arrangements such as rates, terms of service, and
shipper commitment of cargo between the two respective parties.
Generally, shippers with large volumes of cargo and/or regularly
scheduled shipment needs are in the best position to negotiate these
contacts with shipping lines. In some cases, service contracts are
possibly dominating scheduled liner services such as in the Japan to
U.S. trades, where it is estimated that more than 80 percent of liner
cargo moves under service contracts.7
The Act's inclusion of independent action on tariff rates by
individual conference lines has also provided a method for increas
ing the degree of competition in the U.S. international liner trades.
Under these provisions, any conference line can establish their own
rate separate from one filed in a conference's tariff on 10-days'
notice. This situation will often lead to individual shipping lines filing
rates under independent action that are below the conference's
tariff. This can lead to lower transportation costs for those shippers
whose cargo moves under independent action rates. The use of in
dependent action has grown over the last couple of years. As an
example, in April, 1988, the liner members of the Asia North
America Eastbound Rate Agreement took over 2,400 independent
actions, more than in all of 1987.8
Decisions by the FMC within the last year, however, are begin
ning to place limits on individual liner flexibility for determining rates
and services under the Act.9 The FMC has banned the use of
changes to service contract rates based on verbal quotes a shipper
may have received, known in the industry as “Crazy Eddies."10
Instead, the only justification for modification to a service contract
rate is the publication elsewhere of a rate in a tariff or other service
contract below the existing contract rate. An additional pricing
constraint on shipping lines under consideration by the FMC is to

4
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bar rate changes from a published tariff after cargo is in transit,
known as pocket rates, in order to prevent undermining of filed tariff
rates.
Another decision by the FMC allows conferences to ban
independent action by their members on loyalty contracts whereby
a lower rate may be available to a shipper who makes a specific
minimum cargo commitment. Previously, mandatory independent
action was available to individual conference lines on loyalty
contracts. Mandatory independent action still exists on normal rate
or service items filed in a conference's tariff which are available to all
shippers. The above actions and decisions, if fully implemented, will
probably result in increased rates paid by some shippers who are
using conference lines for their liner shipping needs.

Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988
This recent international trade bill deals not only with general
trade issues but also specifically with discrimination by foreign
governments against U.S. liner operators. With regard to shipping,
the intent of the legislation is to increase the power of the FMC to
deal with unfair conditions affecting U.S. flag shipping.11 The
legislation changes the regulation of liner shipping in areas such as
the inclusion of intermodal activities as subject to investigation and
remedy, a wider range of penalties available to the FMC, a shorten
ing in the length of an investigation of alleged discrimination, and
subpoena power for the FMC to obtain critical information.12
As a result of the powers given to it by the 1988 Act, the FMC
has proposed new sanctions against foreign lines (in addition to
those previously available) to include:
* limits on sailings or volume or type of cargo carried to U.S.
ports:
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* suspension of agreements relating to preferential terminal
arrangements;
* space chartering, or pooling of cargo or revenues in
intermodal service;
* fines of up to $1 million per voyage;
* requests to the U.S. Customs Service and/or Coast Guard to
deny vessel clearance or entry.13
The proposed sanctions, which may be adopted in their entirety or
modified before final implementation, will potentially give the FMC
much greater power to control unfair shipping practices.

CURRENT LINER SERVICE DEVELOPMENTS
Intermodalism
Intermodal liner services have continued to grow over the last
few years, not only in the U.S. international trades but on other liner
service routes as well.14 Intermodal service in the U.S. international
trades today consists of three basic forms as follows:
* microbridge, in which overland transportation between an
interior point and a port is coordinated with ocean
transportation;
* minibridge, in which a segment of an all-water ocean
transportation movement is replaced by an overland
movement to/from an intermediate port;
* landbridge, in which coordinated land transportation is
substituted for a mid-portion of an all-water ocean
transportation movement.15

6
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In order to develop an efficient and effective intermodal service,
a number of key elements must be in place. A shipping line must
have coordinated services with carriers in one or more land-based
modes of transportation. In the U.S., intermodal ocean service is
available in coordination with both rail and highway carriers to/from
many interior points. The ocean carrier must possess an adequate
pool of equipment in the form of containers, chassis, container
cranes, and container-handling equipment. A smooth flow with
minimal delays must be accomplished in vessel discharge and
loading as well as in cargo flow in the terminal area. Finally, a
computerized control system is critical in the functioning of the inter
modal system to ensure a high level of service.
Today, many shipping lines in the U.S. international liner trades
offer intermodal service. Although pioneered by carriers such as
American President Lines (APL) and Sea-Land Services (Sea-Land), a
number of foreign lines also offer similar types of service. As an
example, APL provides an intermodal service which includes a
computerized information system that includes single transaction
capability and integrated rail and highway transportation with a
network of over 130 terminals throughout North America.16 SeaLand also offers a highly developed intermodal system which
includes overland rail and trucking services to much of the continen
tal United States.17
A key component of intermodal liner service in the U.S. trades is
the development of intermodal rail, and to some extent, trucking
services. Rail service, known as container on flat car (COFC), is used
for longer distance overland movements while trucking is generally
used for shorter distance movements. In some cases, the intermodal
rail service is operated by a shipping line with the actual line-haul
rail service provided by contract between the shipping line and a rail
carrier. In other cases a railroad may provide the service which is
available to any shipping line that wishes to use the service. The
railcars used in the service can be owned by either the shipping line
or the railroad.
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One of the most recent developments in intermodal rail service
is the use of double-stack trains where the containers are carried two
high. These services result in lower transportation costs because
more containers can be carried with a reduction in the weight of the
rail cars and only a small increase in the number of engines and rail
crew size. The growth of these services has been rapid (see Table
1); thirty weekly eastbound double-stack services in 1986 increased
to ninety-six in 1987. The weekly TEU capacity was over 38,000 in
1987, up from 18,000 in 1986.18 It has been estimated that in 1987
double-stack cars accounted for approximately thirty-five percent of
all container miles carried by rail, up from virtually zero in 1983.19
The two largest double-stack lines for both frequency and
capacity were American President Lines and Sea-Land. Nearly every
other double-stack service was operated by a foreign-flag line or
other type of carrier. The origins and destinations for these services
are found in Table 2. Los Angeles, Seattle, and Long Beach are the
principal eastbound ports on the U.S. west coast for double-stack
service and the first two show the largest growth between 1986 and
1987. The principal destinations are Chicago and New York, both
with large growth between the two years. In nearly every case, the
double-stack trains serving New York also provide service to
Chicago.
As intermodalism has grown, the nature of the service provided
has also changed. The size of containers has been growing with
lengths increasing from forty feet to forty-five and then to forty-eight
feet. Container heights have increased from 8.0 feet to 8.5 and 9.5
feet. Most recently, containers of fifty-three feet in length have been
introduced by APL. Some of the new containers introduced by APL
and others have been initially intended for domestic service only.
Thus, the intermodal liner services are no longer confined to just
international transportation but are also extending the overland
portion of the transportation movement to also include the domestic
market.
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TABLE 1
EASTBOUND DOUBLE - STACK TRAINS FROM
U.S. WEST COAST BY CARRIER

1986

1987
Carrier

Weekly
TEU
Frequency Capacity

Weekly
TEU
Frequency Capacity

17

8,830

8

3,480

Sea-Land

8

3,920

7

2,800

K Line

4

1,240

1

400

Maersk

2

1,120

1

560

NYK

5

1,060

1

400

OOCL

2

660

1

360

MOL

1

480

1

400

Evergreen

2

400

—

...

Hanjin

1

400

...

—

HJCL

1

400

...

...

YS Line

2

260

...

...

J Line

2

200

...

...

NOL

1

200

...

...

—

—

2

700

American President Lines

U.S. Lines
VO-MTO's3
Totals

48

19,000

8

9,110

96

38,170

30

18,210

aVessel operating multimodal transport operators
Sources: Adapted from Review Of Maritime Transport 1987 and 1986.
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TABLE 2
EASTBOUND DOUBLE - STACK TRAINS BY ORIGIN
AND DESTINATION

1987a
West Coast Origin

1986a

Weekly
TEU
Frequency Capacity

Weekly
TEU
Frequency Capacity

Long Beach

9

3,700

6

2,300

Los Angeles

22

8,600

7

2,800

1

560

1

400

Oakland
Portland

1

300

—

—

Seattle

9

3,320

2

1,080

Destination15

Chicago

35

14,150

17

7,000

Cincinnati

2

560

1

200

Columbus

5

1,360

1

400

Memphis

7

2,480

1

400

New York

2

7,780

8

3,500

Houston/Dallas

7

2,020

2

760

New Orleans

1

460

2

760

Atlanta

8

3,900

2

700

aVessel operating multimodal transport operators (VO-MTO's) not included.
bMany stack trains operate to more than one destination; frequencies and
capacities cannot be summed.
Sources: Adapted from Review Of Maritime Transport 1987 and 1986.
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In order to tie an intermodal and international transportation
system together, many shipping companies have implemented
sophisticated computer systems for management and control. As
with intermodalism itself, APL and Sea-Land have been the innova
tors for these computerized systems with Eagle Data Access and SeaTrac, respectively. These computer systems, and others like them,
provide for shipper/consignee access to electronic booking and
tracking of intermodal cargo, vessel schedules, container equipment
access, and vessel space status as well as computer generation of
required documentation,20 all of which benefits a line's customers.
More recently, Sea-Land has developed a system known as Sea-Pay
in which the freight billing and payment are handled electronically.21

Round-the-World Liner Service
A fairly recent development is the reimplementation of roundthe-world (RTW) liner service, in which vessels sail in only one
direction rather than on a route serving one geographic region.
Only a limited number of ports are served with cargo from outlying
areas brought to the load center ports by either feeder vessels or
overland carriers. Overland transportation may be an intermodal
service or a more traditional non-integrated service. Although a
recent development, RTW service existed previously in the more
traditional liner trades. For example, APL had such service up until
the late 1970's, although that service did not match the current
services since it handled primarily break-bulk cargoes.
The innovators in the new RTW services were Evergreen
Shipping of Taiwan and U.S. Lines of the United States.22 Both
services started in 1984 and were gradually brought up to a sailing
schedule of weekly service from the selected load center ports.
Evergreen started and continues to operate their service in both
eastbound and westbound directions between the Far East, North
America, Europe, the Mediterranean, and the Mideast. U.S. Lines'
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service was only in an eastbound direction covering the same basic
service areas as Evergreen. In late 1986, U.S. Lines filed for bank
ruptcy and the vessels of the RTW service were sold.
More recently, other lines such as Senator Line have started
RTW service while Evergreen has expanded its service. In most
cases these services use large vessels with limited numbers of ports of
call. RTW services have generally required large, regular volumes of
cargo in order to be profitable, given the high levels of vessel,
operating, and start-up costs. Since these services may not provide
as high a level of service as those of intermodal carriers, the rates a
RTW liner service can charge are often lower than those for intermo
dal service.23 The success that Evergreen in RTW service can
partially be explained by the fact that they offer intermodal service in
conjunction with the RTW service. The number of lines offering
RTW service continues to be much more limited than those offering
intermodal services, indicating that there may not be a high level of
shipper demand for this service.

Vessel Size
Containerization in the liner trades led to the development of
new vessel designs in order to take advantage of the new transporta
tion technology. The initial vessels, however, were often small and
in many cases converted from existing vessels not designed for
containerization, thus creating inefficient container ships. More
recently, however, container vessels have increased in technological
sophistication to better use the technology of containerization as
well as the more recent intermodal liner services. The increased
sophistication has put pressure on shipping lines to reduce operating
costs which has led to an escalation of container ship sizes.24
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Newer containerships are now routinely above 2,500 TEU
(twenty-foot equivalent length containers) capacity with lengths of
800-900 feet and more. As of mid-1988, nearly forty percent of the
world container fleet was of more than 2,500 TEU capacity, while
ninety-two percent of the capacity to be added by mid-1990 is of
this size.25 Container vessels on order or placed in service since the
beginning of 1987 or currently out for bid will add approximately
397,000 TEU to the world fleet.26 Characteristics of some recent or
projected containerships are found in Table 3. Of particular note is
the APL C-10 class vessel with a beam of over 129 feet. This design
represents a break with tradition since these vessels cannot transit
the Panama Canal where the maximum beam is 106 feet. All other
existing vessels listed in the table are able to fit through the Panama
Canal although many of them do not actually transit the canal.
The increasing vessel sizes place a number of constraints on
containerized liner service systems. Additional investments are
required to acquire new and larger vessels and containers, improve
and enlarge port facilities, purchase new container cranes and other
handling equipment, and improve the sea/overland transportation
interface. The large vessel sizes create more inflexibility in how
these container vessels are used. The number of trade routes where
these vessels can call are limited by available cargo volumes and
length of route. Additionally, many ports cannot be used due to
channel, pier, and container crane constraints. The new APL ships
described earlier are not only confined to the Pacific but are able to
call at only eight ports throughout their area of service.27 As a result,
increased reliance must be placed on feeder services to the load
center ports, either via smaller containerships or overland modes.
These feeder services are an important consideration in the function
ing of intermodal and round-the-world liner services previously
described.
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Overcapacity
The escalating sizes of vessels, particularly for containerships
discussed in the previous section, have helped to create an oversup
ply of shipping service in the liner trades. In the world general cargo
and unitized fleets, which include container, break-bulk, and other
types of vessels, the overcapacity in deadweight was on the order of
six percent.28 This represented a decline for the general cargo fleet
and the same level for the unitized fleet when compared with the
early to mid I970's. Since a relatively large percentage of break-bulk
and containerized cargoes are of low density, deadweight may not
be a good measure for evaluating overcapacity.
A previous paper reported estimates of containership overcapac
ity in the Trans-Pacific and Trans-Atlantic container trades, with
overall load factors for TEU of seventy-six and seventy percent
respectively in 1986, representing declines from 1983 figures.29 A
more recent report estimates that the load factors in both trades are
nearly the same or worse in the 1986-87 time period, being ap
proximately seventy percent for both trades, as found in Table 4.30
The Europe/Far East container trades are estimated to have a higher
load factor of about eighty-three percent. This data indicates that
not only is the overcapacity problem persisting but it is somewhat
growing worse, at least for the U.S. containerized liner trades.
The worsening overcapacity problem in the U.S. liner trades
creates a number of difficulties for shipping lines. One of these is
increased competition among the lines in these trades, even when
conferences are found on a particular trade route. Since confer
ences in the U.S. liner trades are required to be open, a shipping
line can withdraw from the conference if constrained too much
knowing that it can easily rejoin the conference if it desires. As a
result, downward pressure is often exerted on the rates by inde
pendent liner operators and the threat of conference members to
become independents.

14
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TABLE 3
SELECTED CHARACTERISTICS OF LARGE CONTAINERSHIPS

Sea-land
Characteristic

Atlantic’

Evergreen

APL
C-9

C-10

G-Class

New

Length, ft.

950

860

903

750

N/A

Beam, ft.

106

106

129.2

105.6

N/A

Draft, ft.

29.5

35

41

32

N/A

Speed, knots

19.1

25

24.2

19.5

N/A

2,500

4,300

2,728

4,000

Capacity, TEUb

3,400

^Former New York class vessels of U.S. Lines; vessel TEU capacity downsized
from 4,482.
bTEU = twenty-foot equivilent units.
Sources: Marine Engineering/Log, Containerisation International, American
Shipper.

This inability to implement or sustain rate increases is exactly
what has often happened in the U.S. liner trades.31 Liner shipping
rates of the U.S. Atlantic/Northern Europe Conference declined
approximately fourteen percent between 1984 and 1986. The
twenty-five percent decline of liner freight rates to parts of Europe
between 1985 and 1987, including both U.S. and non-U.S. trades, is
a further indication of this downward rate pressure. Liner rates in
the eastbound Trans-Pacific trades are estimated to have declined by
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ten percent or more during 1988. As a result, a number of confer
ences and shipping lines have found it difficult to increase operating
revenues, even in the face of escalating operating costs and the need
to purchase additional vessels and equipment to remain competitive.
Another issue facing shipping lines due to overcapacity is the use
of rebates, where a shipping line makes payments to customers who
use their liner service. This effectively reduces the transportation
rate charged below that filed in the legal tariff. Although rebating is
a common practice in the world liner trades, Federal law prohibits
such actions by shipping lines in the U.S. international liner trades.
Previous enforcement action was undertaken by the FMC in the
Trans-Atlantic trades and similar action is now underway in the

TABLE 4
SELECTED CHARACTERISTRICS OF LARGE CONTAINERSHIPS

Trade Route

Estimated
Annual
Cargo
TEU, mm's

Estimated
Annual
Capacity
TEU, mm's

Load Factor
(Percent)

Trans-Pacific

4.4

6.3

70%

Trans-Atlantic

2.8

4.0

70%

Europe/Far East

2.0

2.4

83%

Sources: Adapted from Review of Maritime Transport 1987.
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Trans-Pacific trades.32 One line was recently fined $2.5 million and
further enforcement action is expected. Liner firms find it difficult to
resist using rebates to encourage cargo bookings given the current
overcapacity, but the rebates are illegal nonetheless.
The current overcapacity has thus created financial difficulties
for some shipping lines, both foreign and U.S.33 As an example, U.S.
Lines had to declare Chapter 11 bankruptcy in late 1986 because of
difficulties with its RTW service and will apparently not recover from
this situation. Not only were the 11 rates too low and vessel
capacity too large, but U.S. Lines was not carrying enough high rated
cargo. Lykes Line and Hapag-Lloyd also withdrew from the Trans
pacific trades while Showa Line of Japan withdrew in early 1988
from nearly all liner trades including the Trans-Pacific. Financial
difficulties are also being experienced on other trade routes due to
the overcapacity problem.

ANALYSIS
The environment for liner shipping in the U.S. international
trades today is one that potentially creates both problems and
opportunities for all concerned. Whether a firm is a shipping line,
shipper, consignee, or intermediary, its operations have been
affected. The reaction to the current environment and the anticipa
tion of the future environment will help to determine a firm's success
or failure. The following sections examine the impacts on and
reactions of shipping lines and their customers.

Shipping Line Effects
The effects of the environment on liner shipping are numerous.
The Shipping Act of 1984 determines to some extent the nature and
scope of these effects. The three principal components of intermodal authority, mandatory independent action, and service contracts
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discussed earlier have resulted in changes in the industry that have,
in some cases, worsened the effects of the current overcapacity
problem. Mandatory independent action and service contracts, in
particular, have been used by individual shipping lines to lower the
rates charged for international liner transportation. As a result,
shipping line profitability has eroded for many lines since lower rates
don't always result in increased total revenue and/or profitability.
A number of surveys and meetings evaluating the Shipping Act
have taken place since its implementation nearly five years ago.34
These have found major disagreements between how shipping lines
view the Act as compared to shippers (covered below). Shipping
lines appear to have the most concerns about the mandatory
independent action for conferences required by the Act, which has
generally led to a depressed level of rates. Shipping lines have also
expressed reservations about service contracts, which have often
resulted in lower rates than might otherwise have been obtained.
Shipping lines, however, have positive views about other
portions of the Act as well. Principal among these are the stream
lined process to implement new rates and services, increased anti
trust immunity, and the ability to offer intermodal rates and services.
This last view is reinforced by the large growth in intermodal services
since the passage of the Act in 1984. Overall, the overcapacity that
exists in the liner trades accounts to some degree for the carrier
dissatisfaction. In a market with a better balance between supply
and demand, there would be much less pressure to lower rates
through independent action or service contracts.
The liner conferences and individual lines in the U.S. trades
have instituted actions to address the overcapacity issue and its
impacts. Although overcapacity affects most liner trades in the
world, it appears to be more acute in the U.S. trades because of the
size of the gap between supply of capacity and cargo available. One
way in which this situation can be addressed is for liner conferences
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to rationalize (reduce) service among their members in order to
decrease total capacity. For example, conference and independent
shipping lines in the trans-Pacific trades have recently agreed to cut
eastbound container capacity.35 The result of this rationalization
may be the increase of shipping rates in both directions on the trans
pacific trades and reduced numbers of independent actions by
individual lines.
Another strategy to cope with overcapacity has been to form
joint services through what are known as space charters. These
services use the ships of one or more lines, with space on each
vessel allocated to two or more shipping lines, even though the
vessel may be operated by a single liner firm. A space charter
agreement allows two or more lines to participate on a liner route
without each line having to operate its own vessels, thus easing the
overcapacity situation. Space charters have been concluded, among
others, by Sea-Land with Nedlloyd and Trans Freight Lines and
Atlantic Container Line with Wilhelmsen and Hapag-Lloyd in the
trans-Atlantic trades, and Barber Blue Sea with Norwegian Special
ized Auto Carriers in the trans-Pacific trades.36 Another possibility is
the merger of shipping lines in order to create a more efficient
carrier, such as the proposed merger of Lykes with Farrell Lines.37
The continued evolution of liner service appears to be toward a
greater offering of intermodal service, as opposed to more traditional
liner service or RTW service. Although RTW service has expanded
somewhat, the bankruptcy of U.S. Lines removed a major competi
tor from this market. Evergreen has enjoyed success in this segment
of international liner shipping but few other lines have implemented
similar services. Traditional liner services, which handle break-bulk
or general cargo, are still quite viable in the less developed U.S.
international trades such as those with much of Africa. The liner
trades between industrialized nations will probably be dominated
even more by container and intermodal shipping in the years to
come.
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Intermodal service, as discussed previously, has grown dramati
cally. Part of this is undoubtedly due to the freedom granted by the
Shipping Act of 1984 for conferences to offer such service. These
services have expanded to include multiple overland modes, the
stack-trains described earlier, domestic transportation service, and
well-developed computer information systems to support intermodalism and are now marketed as a value-added service.38 The stacktrain services, through their expansion to domestic transportation,
are apparently beginning to replace the trailer on flat car (TOFC)
intermodal services offered by U.S. railroads. More and more ship
ping lines are expanding the scope of intermodal service they can
directly offer, as is found with APL and Evergreen. Sea-Land has
taken this one step further since, through their ownership by CSX,
they are often able to offer a complete intermodal movement for
which CSX has complete responsibility.

Shipping Line Customer Effects
As with the shipping lines, shippers have also been dramatically
affected by the Shipping Act of 1984. In the case of shippers, the
effects of the Act have, for the most part, been quite positive.39
While shipping lines find independent action and service contracts a
barrier to achieving financial success, just the opposite is true of
shippers primarily because rate reductions through both means have
been quite prevalent in recent years. Not all shippers have necessar
ily benefited as a result of service contracts and independent action,
since some are not large enough to enjoy the deepest rate reduc
tions.
There have been a number of specific benefits enjoyed by
shippers in addition to the reduced transportation costs resulting
from reduced rate levels. Among these benefits are increased
intermodal services, faster transit times, more sailings, and greater
choices between the origin/destination gateways used.40 Many of
these benefits have resulted from the increased intermodal services
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since these services must emphasize speed, frequency, reliability,
and geographic scope of coverage in order to attract shipper cargo.
Thus, there have been a range of benefits to shippers as a result of
the Shipping Act.
The overcapacity in international liner shipping today has
generally benefitted shippers who use these services. Overcapacity,
with the resulting pressure to decrease rates, has allowed shippers
the opportunity to negotiate favorable shipping rates. This has been
done through service contracts or through conference rate levels and
independent action on the part of individual shipping lines. Concur
rently, shipping lines have had to be responsive to the full range of
needs of shippers, thus enabling many shippers to receive higher
levels of service. The lower levels of rates have created some
uncertainties with regard to the availability of particular shipping
services when a line drops a particular service.41
The range of liner service available to shippers today is much
greater than it was only a few years ago. Shippers can now choose
among traditional break-bulk, containerized, RTW, and intermodal
services. In order to make these choices, however, a shipper needs
to better understand the transportation decision environment. Thus,
to make a good decision about what carrier and service to use, the
shipper may have to make a total cost analysis of the transportation
alternatives. For a high value or perishable cargo, a reliable intermo
dal service can potentially offer the lowest total logistics cost,42 even
though the transportation cost may be higher than other liner
alternatives. A shipper of lower value non-perishable goods,
however, might be better to choose a more traditional, container
ized, or RTW liner service offering lower transportation and total
logistics cost.
Although an intermodal service may offer a higher level of
service, it does have some potential drawbacks for a shipper. One
of these is that the shipper will no longer have control over the
selection of individual overland carriers. The intermodal shipping
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line will, in most cases, have already selected the inland carriers to
use for its intermodal service. The heavy reliance on rail transporta
tion could lead to increased loss and damage when compared with
the use of a highway carrier for overland transportation. These
considerations will often be outweighed by the advantages to
intermodal shipping.
Other types of liner service also have potential drawbacks as
well. The non-intermodal services require a shipper to make a
wider range of transportation decisions regarding type of service to
use, which carriers to select, how to ensure efficient cargo transfer
from one carrier to another, and what routes to use. Additionally,
the amount of documentation will generally be much greater for the
non-intermodal services. For shippers who are not well versed in
international transportation, intermodal service offers a way to ship
cargo internationally without having to necessarily acquire the
expertise in-house. Thus, intermodal liner service can be advanta
geous to not only shippers of high value cargo but to others as well.

CONCLUSIONS
The dynamic environment both within and outside liner
shipping in the U.S. international trades has caused many changes.
Regulatory changes have created an environment of greater compe
tition in liner shipping. The Shipping Act of 1984 with its provisions
for intermodal service, independent action, and service contracts,
created stronger competition. Recent rulings or pending actions by
the FMC may, however, reduce carrier pricing flexibility with
resulting rate increases. The outcome of a formal review of the Act
will take place during 1989, and the implementation of any subse
quent recommendations cannot be determined at the present time.
Likewise, the actual role of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness
Act of 1988 in liner shipping has yet to be fully determined.
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In spite of the uncertainties, the current overcapacity in the
industry will probably continue to exert downward pressure on
rates. The increasing vessel and fleet sizes will continue to contrib
ute to this overcapacity. Current efforts in the industry to rationalize
liner service through space charters, mergers, and capacity restric
tions should relieve some of the pressure. The capacity reductions
in the industry will probably not be sufficient to alleviate the situ
ation in the near term. As a result, rate increases may be difficult to
sustain and practices such as below tariff rates and rebating may be
difficult to completely eliminate in the U.S. international trades.
The competitive environment has also witnessed a growth in the
types of international liner service available. Intermodalism has
grown rapidly and can be expected to continue to expand, although
the growth rate will slow at some point in the future. RTW services
appear to have stabilized in size and market impact and can be ex
pected to remain stable without major environmental changes.
Containerized shipping, be it via intermodal, RTW, or traditional
liner service will continue to dominate the trades w'ith developed
nations. Traditional break-bulk liner services appear to be confined
primarily to the trades with less-developed nations where the
overland transportation infrastructure is more rudimentary.
The current difficulties with the level of rates and the wide range
of liner services available has created a real need for more efficient
and effective management. Shipping lines require management that
is able to cope with an environment of overcapacity and reduced
rate levels. Management must also be in a position to make effective
decisions regarding the competing needs to reduce overcapacity yet
at the same time purchase new' vessels and equipment to maintain a
competitive edge. This tradeoff is especially critical for intermodal
lines, where the current technological lead on competition may not
last very long.
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Likewise, shippers, consignees, and intermediaries require
effective management. Although lower rates are generally an
advantage to shipping line customers, decisions are still required in a
number of areas. The wide range of services available and the
potential flexibility in rates means that a firm must do a careful
analysis to determine the best shipping alternative. This analysis
must not only include the ocean transportation cost incurred but
also other transportation and logistics costs. Thus, the changing en
vironment is a challenge to both shipping lines and their customers.
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THE TIME DIMENSION IN RAILROAD OPERATING SCHEDULES:
FACT OF SEMANTIC SMOG

by
Jerry R. Foster and Sandra Strasser
University of Colorado, Boulder

INTRODUCTION
The transportation service provided by a railroad can be viewed
in terms of the model shown in Figure 1.

Figure 1
Railroad Service Model

Economy

Railroad
Traffic
Competition
Highway
Water
Pipe

Carried

Level of Service
Speed
Reliability
Loss & Damage
Equipment
Information

Rates/Prices

Of these components, the level of service warrants closer examina
tion as the literature contains little information about how railroads
operate to attain a given level of service.
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Railroads have, historically, been criticized by many scholars for
their inattentiveness to service (Wyckoff 1976, Gellman 1986).
Many recent articles have surveyed a plethora of shippers to deter
mine railroads responsiveness in meeting and dependent upon the
audience being questioned. Certainly, members of CURE (Consum
ers United for Rail Equity) have expressed dissatisfaction with the
service/price option bundle (right half of Figure 1) provided by
railroads (Grimm and Smith 1986, 1987). Other shippers, often
contracting for their transportation purchase, have been very
satisfied with performance of rail service (Rhea and Schrock 1987).
The purpose of this article is not, however, to add to the
number of articles exploring shippers' attitudes and perceptions.
Rather, this explanatory effort is to provide a taxonomy of railroads
operating factors which can assist traffic and railroad managers in
their efforts to improve railroad service (Murphy 1988, Baghi 1987,
Bookbinder 1987, Urba 1978). This article expands previous
research concerning shippers' needs, but form the perspective of
how railroads actually fulfill their service obligations (Williamson
1985, Lieb and Miller 1988, Ditmeyer 1987). The focal issue, form
a railroad perspective, is a comparative assessment of how two
Class I railroads provide service to their customers by type of train.
The paper is organized as follows: The next section discusses
railroad operating characteristics of two railroads, one eastern and
one western. Comparisons of operating data are presented, fol
lowed by a discussion of potential impacts. The final section
provides some tentative conclusions and areas for future research.
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RAILROAD OPERATING SERVICE FACTORS
When providing service to shippers in a competitive environ
ment, railroads offer a bundle of services (Figure 1): sufficient
equipment, information, claims adjustments, adherence to sched
ules, and speed of service. It is the latter aspect which has received
little attention from scholars. Most studies assume speed is impor
tant, but typically analyze it on the basis of line haul miles per hour.
In fact, speed is a function of several factors. These include line haul
speed, arrival and departure times, amount of time spent in a
terminal, and cutoff and availability times. Any of these elements
can dramatically alter the line haul speed and, therefore, the ability
of a railroad to fulfill shipper demands.
Simplistically, railroad sales personnel solicit business from
shippers by offering the rail service at a specified price for a given
schedule (Murphy 1988). Thus, the shipper is told that the shipment
must be made available at a specified time and will be delivered at
some future date and time for the quoted rate. Shippers, consignees
and consignors, then plan their "Production schedules" based upon
this quotation. Assuming prices remain competitive, the shipper will
continue to utilize the rail carrier as long as the service performance
level continues to be reliable.
Historically, railroads have not maintained high reliability levels
and have experienced decline in market share (Association of
American Railroads 1986). In part, this has been a result of the
changes occurring in production requirements of shippers. For
example, inventories have become increasingly expensive and
shippers have opted for faster transit times and mode to control
inventory costs. The next section explores how two railroads
operated their trains to fulfill the dynamic movement requirements.
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TAXONOMY AND OPERATIONAL PROVISION OF SERVICE
Two Class I railroads were selected for this study. These two
roads, one eastern and one western, account for approximately
thirty percent of rail traffic in the United States, as measured by ton
miles, freight revenue, or miles of track.
Train briefs, published operating schedules, were analyzed to
ascertain how the time dimension (door-to-door time) is actually
performed. The train brief data does not permit an examination of
adherence to the published schedule, thus the variance cannot be
addressed.
The taxonomy of the speed variable (time dimension) is com
prised of several elements from an operational perspective (Figure
2). Each of these elements contribute to the amount of time it takes
to move a shipment door-to-door and, ultimately, determine
whether or not the railroad can remain competitive.
While the distance, miles, reflects the geographical distance,
other elements dictate the time lost in transit. Cutoff times for
intermodal traffic represent the initial carrier contact with the
physical shipment. From the perspective of the shipper, it represents
the point for the door-to-door clock to start. The cutoff time can
inhibit or promote customer service. For example, an early time
(1500) means that the shipper must have the shipment at the
intermodal hub no later than this time in order to be placed aboard
the appropriate train. Such a cutoff time, in theory, may result in
"idle time" for the workforce of the shipper if the normal workday is
from 8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m.
Once the shipment is received, the railroad has a limited
amount of time to load the traffic aboard the intermodal car and/or
switch the car into the train. The amount of time will vary, but will
contribute to the total transit time in any event.
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Figure 2
Operating Elements Inherent in Speed

Element

Definition

Miles

miles between origin and
destination

Cutoff

time shipment must be
tendered at origin

Departure

scheduled departure time

Speed

miles per hour, line haul

Arrival

scheduled arrival time

Availability

scheduled time intermodal
traffic made available at
destination

Day

number of days in transit
(from day shipment tendered
to day of delivery)

Terminal

time, in hours, spent in
terminals between origin and
destination

Hours

scheduled duration of one
haul trip, in hours

Door-to-Door

total trip time, cutoff to
availability
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Following the departure of the train, the line haul speed is
governed by the speed of the train and the number of terminals
through which the train passes. Typically, trains operating shorter
distances will incur less terminal delays than longer trains. Longer
trains incur delays due to mandatory inspections, crew changes,
refueling, and/or awaiting the arrival of interline traffic or scheduling
meets with other trains.
Upon arrival, the cars are again switched or spotted to the
intermodal terminal where the trailers or containers are made
available for delivery to the consignee. The total trip time from
cutoff to availability constitutes the door-to-door time so critical to
the shipper. This total time will vary between intermodal, priority,
and general freight trains.
It is hypothesized that intermodal trains will operate at greater
speeds and incur fast door-to-door times than other types of trains
(priority and general). This should occur as intermodal traffic is of
higher value and more time-sensitive than other traffic. According to
the Association of American Railroads, intermodal traffic averages
$50-$60 per ton while other traffic is considerably less (Association
of American Railroads 1986).
Priority trains, while carrying time sensitive commodities, should
exhibit slower transit times and greater terminal delays as these
commodities are not as highly valued as intermodal traffic.
General freight trains should, comparatively, reveal the greatest
transit times and greatest variance in departure times as they haul
the least time-sensitive commodities. While not a part of this
analysis, it can be speculated that these trains also would carry
freight with the lowest comparative rates.
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OPERATING CHARACTERISTICS OF SPEED
The operational elements of the time dimension are shown in
Figure 3 for the two railroads by type of train.
As shown in Figure 3, the intermodal trains for both railroads are
scheduled to operate at faster speeds. This would suggest that the
railroads are attempting to fulfill the needs of shippers for his higher
valued freight. Similarly, the speed of the priority trains is greater
than the general trains.
Figure 3
Operating Elements for Daily Scheduled Trains, By Type

Western Railroad

Eastern Railroad

Elements

IM

Prior

Gen

IM

Prior

Gen

No. of Trains

44

33

32

41

29

34

Ave. Miles

988

1141

417

715

584

329

Ave. Speed

31.4

24.2

18.0

28.0

18.9

16.9

Ave. Trip Hours

32.7

49.9

24.8

26.7

33.5

19.8

Days

2.6

3.2

1.9

2.2

2.4

1.9

Terminal

3.6

10.2

5.5

2.4

8.5

5.3

Cutoff to Dptr.

2.2

NA

NA

2.3

NA

NA

Arrival to Avail

3.2

NA

NA

3.8

NA

NA

Note: IM - Intermodal; Prior - Priority; Cen - Ceneral
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The average miles per trip for the western road reflects the
longer geographical distances to be traversed when compared to the
eastern road. The data also indicates that priority trains are domi
nated by long hauls while both intermodal and general trains
operate in short route corridors. The longer trip miles of the western
road also are reflected in the longer terminal times as it incurs more
inspections, refueling stops, and crew changes.
The days to receipt, departure to arrival days, appear as antici
pated. A third day delivery for the western road reflects the longer
average distances. Similarly, priority and general trains incur greater
terminal times. Priority trains must await connecting traffic from
interlining roads or connections from other trains on the same road.
General trains handle non-priority freight and tend to incur more
switching delays. These trains also travel shorter distances which is
indicative of more local operations.
The additional data provided by the train briefs for intermodal
trains permits greater insight into management attitudes for service.
Quite naturally, these "hot shot" trains spend, comparatively, little
time in terminals. Of the time, most is devoted to crew changes.
A more interesting statistic concerns the cutoff to departure
times for the intermodal trains. Both railroads have added an
average of two hours to tier schedules in order to handle the
shippers' trailers or containers. For critical freight, this would appear
to be an inordinate amount of time given the comparatively higher
freight rates and cargo values.
Equally disturbing is the amount of time taken to make TOFC/
COFC traffic available once it has arrived at the destination. Both
roads need an average of over three hours to provide the consignees
with their traffic.

38

Journal of Transportation Management

When the time taken on both ends of the trip (cutoff to depar
ture and arrival to availability) are taken in to consideration, both
roads exhibit a deterioration in service.
The door-to-door time provides some insight into the relative
decline in market share to the trucking industry. So much time is
lost in terminal delays that shippers may feel trucks offer faster
service for the highly valued commodities. (See Figure 4)
While speed and transit times are important, the authors also
feel that the actual times that trains arrived and departed might be
critical for the three types of trains. Arrivals and departures for both
railroads were grouped by the time of day as shown in Figures 5
and 6.

Figure 4
Comparison of Line Hauls to Door-to-Door*
Hours and Speed
Road #1

Road #2

Average line haul trip hours

32.7

26.7

Average door-to-door trip hours

38.4

34.4

Average line haul speed

31.4

28.0

Average door-to-door speed

26.3

21.3

* Door-to-door calculated by adding the differences between cutoff and
departure times, arrival and availability times to total line haul trip hours
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Figure 5
Arrivals by Time of Day
Type of Train
Time

Intermodal

Priority

2400-0559

23

18

10

0600-1159

32

8

18

1200-1759

14

20

20

1800-2359

16

16

18

General

Figure 6
Departures by Time of Day
Type of Train
Time

Intermodal

Priority

General

2400-0559

19

14

15

0600-1159

11

15

12

1200-1759

12

13

11

1800-2359

43

20

28
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With the exception of arrivals, where the time of arrival does
exhibit some dependency on the type of train (Chi2 p< .01),
departure for the types of trains appears to be somewhat random.
This would suggest that railroads are, in fact, not scheduling
operations for shipper convenience, but rather for their own
operating convenience.
In assessing cutoff and availability time for intermodal trains by
time of day, it would appear that railroads are less sensitive to
shipper needs with respect to cutoff times than they are for availabil
ity times. As shown in Figure 7, more than 50 percent of the
intermodal trains were made available before noon. His would
suggest that the roads are attempting to adhere to shipper
production schedules.

Figure 7
Combined Availability and Arrival Schedules by Time of Day
Time

Availability

Arrivals

2400-0559

10

23

0600-1159

33

32

1200-1759

23

14

1800-2359

14

16

80*

85

Total

*availability times not reported for five trains
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Figure 8
Combined Cutoff and Departure Schedules by Time of Day
Time

Availability

Arrivals

2400-0559

12

19

0600-1159

15

11

1200-1759

14

12

1800-2359

38

43

79*

85

Total
*cutoff times not reported for six trains

An assessment of cutoff and departure times for both roads,
Figure 8, suggests railroads provide detrimental schedules for
shippers.
Assuming a working day of 8:00 a.m. - 5:00 p.m. for the
shipper, the data indicates that shipments would have to have been
received the previous working day or carried over until the next
working day in order to meet the cutoff time for 12 trains. Twentynine trains, only 36.7 percent, have cutoff times during "normal
working hours" and 23 trains, only 27.1 percent, depart during this
time. This suggests that rail schedules are not coordinated with
shipper production schedules. Such scheduling may impose
burdens on the shipper as the work force of the shipper is structured
in a manner that overtime may be incurred in order to meet rail
schedules.
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IMPACTS AND CONCLUSIONS
This article has been an exploratory effort to comprehend, from
a railroad operating perspective, how two railroads provide service
to shippers. Many recent articles, surveying shippers, have con
tended that service is exceeding cost as a prime consideration for
modal and carrier selection and this study was conducted to learn
how railroads schedule their operations to meet these service
demands.
Two Class I railroads were studied, utilizing operating data
contained in their train briefs. The train briefs represent the sched
ules that railroads plan to offer the shipping public for agreed upon
prices.
The time dimension associated with these schedules is com
prised of several elements, but from the perspective of a shipper, can
be represented in terms of door-to-door time. Thus, the shipper is
concerned not only about line haul speed, but also about the
amount of time delayed in terminals and the delays encountered in
arrivals and departures.
The data suggests that shippers are at the mercy of railroad
schedules for movements of their products. Arrival and departure
times appear to be somewhat random and not coordinated with
"normal" working schedules of the industries served. In addition,
considerable time is lost during transit as well as origin and destina
tion terminals. This would indicate that railroad management must
begin to improve adaptation of rail schedules to the production
requirements of their customers.
At a time when shippers are vitally concerned about escalating
inventory costs and rapidly changing markets, it appears that rail
roads maintain an inordinate amount of slack in schedule perform
ance. If railroads are to recapture market share, they must be better
able to offer operating schedules which truly reflect the needs of the
shipper.
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This exploratory effort represents only two Class I railroads and
additional research is needed to study operating schedules of all
railroads. An official railroad schedule guide is necessary in order to
provide the shipping public with more realistic performance evalu
ations.
Railroads can benefit from this research by comprehending the
pricing differentials that may be available with varying service
options. Obviously, not all commodities require the same time
dimension and it may be possible to segment further operating
performance by customer and commodity.
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THE TRUCK DRIVER SHORTAGE:
AN OVERVIEW AND SOME RECOMMENDATIONS

by
Dr. Stephen A. LeMay and Dr. Stephen Taylor
Mississippi State University

INTRODUCTION
The driver shortage is now a well established and well recog
nized fact in the motor carrier industry. The American Trucking
Association, its member organizations, and virtually every trucking
firm in the United States now must deal with the problems related to
this shortage. And, unfortunately, many of the industry's standard
practices actually worsen this already bad situation.
The effects of the driver shortage have not been uniform
throughout the industry. For some firms, particularly the small,
specialized carriers, the shortage has effectively limited the growth of
their business; due to a lack of qualified drivers, many of these firms
have been unable to take advantage of opportunities that might
otherwise be available to them. For other firms, such as the large,
unionized LTL carriers, the driver shortage has created regional
recruiting problems. While they may retain their current drivers
because of union seniority rules, in many areas the LTL's are having
difficulty attracting new drivers. For still other firms, especially the
large, TL carriers, the shortage has meant runaway turnover, with
annual rates often exceeding 150 percent.
In this paper, we discuss some of the sources of this problem
and examine recent research that may point toward a possible
solution of the driver shortage. Demographic, industry, and firmspecific factors relating to the problem are treated in the sections
that follow.
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DEMOGRAPHIC FACTORS
The change in the demographic make-up of the U.S. workforce
has been a major contributor to the current driver shortage. More
over, current demographic trends indicate that tomorrow's driver
shortage will be far more severe than that of today. This will occur
for two reasons. First, the number of potentially qualified workers in
the labor market is dwindling. Simply put, while the educational
level of the American workforce is the highest it has ever been, the
reading and comprehension level of these workers may be the
lowest they have ever been. The number of applicants who fail the
"dress rehearsals" of the new commercial driver's license tests
supports this statement. For instance, 57% of those taking the
California commercial drivers test fail to achieve a passing grade.1
Second, the makeup of the workforce has shifted away from the
traditional truck driver labor pool, the 25-45 year-old white male.
The people who will be driving trucks for the next twenty years have
already been born. The forecast of the maximum number of people
who might be available in the workforce can, therefore, be fairly
accurate.
Tomorrow's Driver
While the U.S. population will continue to increase in size, its
growth rate will be far slower than in the past. Also, tomorrow's
population, in terms of color, sex, and age, will bear little resem
blance to that of today. According to the Hudson Institute's report,
Workforce 2000:
The population and workforce will grow more slowly
than any time since the 1930's;
Population growth will level off at an annual rate of
0.7 percent by the year 2000;
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The labor force that grew by 2.9% for the 1970's will
expand by 1% annually in the 1990's;
More minorities and women will enter the workforce.2
This slower growth in population makes the last point particu
larly relevant. It now appears that by 1991, 70% of the new entrants
to the job market will be minorities or women3; specifically, 29% of
all new workers will be Hispanic and 17% will be black.4 If these
projections prove accurate, by the year 2000 over 47% of the
workforce will be female, 12% will be black, and 10% will be
Hispanic. The significance of these changes can best be appreciated
when it is noted that in 1979, 42% of the workforce was female,
10% was black, and 5% was Hispanic.5 The significance of these
changes can best be appreciated when it is noted that a 5 percent
age point increase in the proportion of female in the workforce
represents a 5 percentage point change in the proportion of males.
In other words, a 10% swing.
The methods for managing this workforce must change as its
demographic composition changes. It is quite likely that many, if not
most, of yesterday's and today's managerial techniques will not have
a place in the future. After all, it is going to be a "new ball game,"
and these old ways may simply not work. For that matter, they may
not be working very well now, as the next section suggests.

INDUSTRY FACTORS
Several of our introductory points need some expansion. For
small TL and LTL carriers, particularly those in special commodities,
the lack of qualified drivers has limited growth for many years. The
vice-president of personnel for one of the three largest liquid bulk
carriers has stated that in the near future, a driver with DOT certifi
cation for hazardous materials and explosives will be like a freeagent baseball player-able to go wherever he or she wants and able
to name the price.
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Recent interviews with the top managers of 23 liquid bulk and
explosives haulers perhaps best illustrate just how widespread the
effects of this driver shortage are. Everyone of these managers
described incidents where their firms passed up concrete growth
opportunities because of a lack of qualified drivers. Additionally,
they also provided examples of customers who had tried to form
their own private fleets in order to improve service. Yet the custom
ers' efforts were frustrated by the same factors that limited the
carriers: high turnover and a lack of qualified drivers.
The shortage of drivers most clearly affects the LTL carriers in
high cost areas such as New York and California. In one its regions,
a large unionized LTL carrier spent $200,000 on help-wanted ads in
1988 but was able to recruit only two drivers. The large unionized
carriers have not been immune to the labor shortage even in low
cost areas such as Mississippi. For example, a firm with over $500
million in annual revenues spent five months trying (unsuccessfully)
to fill a $12.00 an hour city driver job in jackson, Mississippi, even
though the average wage in the area is a rather low $4.51 an hour.6
Perhaps the most dramatic effects of the driver shortage can be
found in the TL sector of the motor carrier industry. A recent survey
of personnel and safety managers in member firms of the Interstate
Truckload Carriers Conference of the ATA, found that almost 26% of
the responding firms had turnover rates in excess of 76% annually.
Schneider Transport, one of the most highly regarded firms in the
industry, reported an annual turnover rate of 100%, despite a
number of highly innovative programs designed to retain drivers.7
All told, approximately 10% of the fleet belonging to the Interstate
Truckload Carriers Conference is idle due to a lack of drivers.8
Fairly traditional industry practices are actually increasing the
already acute shortage of drivers. Consider the way companies
normally recruit new drivers. The motor carrier industry makes
extensive use of magazine/trade journal advertising in recruiting.
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For example, recent issues of The Owner Operator Directory have
devoted more than 80% of paid advertising space to carriers' pleas
for more drivers. One issue of this publication actually had ads from
98 different carriers. But most of the people who read these
journals already work in the industry. This means that firms, in
effect, are raiding each others' drivers. Since drivers will need
expensive inducements to change jobs, carriers are involved in
bidding wars for their services. But these inducements increase
turnover. The supply of drivers stays the same, but the demand
increases. Bottom line, then, is that payroll costs must increase.
Similarly, a few carriers have attempted to develop a larger pool
of drivers. Some firms have now opened or reopened their in-house
driving schools, while others have developed client relationships
with commercial driving schools and community colleges. But these
programs will contribute only a small number of drivers for the long
run. Furthermore, as long as firms continue "stealing drivers" from
one another, these new "graduates" are unlikely to significantly ease
the driver shortage.
When these practices are considered in light of the demographic
changes discussed earlier in this paper, it becomes critical for the
industry to totally redirect its driver-recruitment strategy. Recruit
ment efforts must be targeted toward new audiences, e.g. Hispanic,
black, women, older people. The "good old boy" in a baseball cap
with a Hank Williams, Jr. song playing in the background, must not
be the star of tomorrow's recruitment literature. Neither will he be
the driver of tomorrow.
Obviously featuring minorities in recruitment advertisements will
not solve the driver shortage. But they are a start, and a good one,
at that.
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FACTORS FOR THE INDIVIDUAL FIRM
Bottom line: the driver shortage is a personnel problem. This
means that the controllable factors include supervisory practices,
recruiting practices, compensation policies, training programs, and
all other activities that affect the way the company deals directly and
indirectly with its drivers. In the motor carrier industry, many of
these personnel practices seem to be founded on false assumptions,
outdated information, and at times, contempt for the employee.
A number of myths about drivers seem to have perpetuated
themselves among managers and supervisors-that drivers are
inherently unreliable as a 'breed'; that they are surly and motivated
solely by money; that they have no loyalty to or concern for the
company; and so on ad nauseum. This is very similar to the philoso
phy expressed in an 1899 Army Officers' Manual: Enlisted men are
basically stupid, but crafty and bear close watching. Such attitudes
tend to be founded on slim evidence (at best) and on experience
with a few drivers.
Probably the most damaging result of these myths is the seem
ingly widespread belief that nothing can be done about many of the
problems with drivers because, well, that is just the way drivers are.
It is very easy simply to blame someone's “nature” for any problems
that exist. However, it is not the way to solve these problems.
Research into drivers' attitudes toward their jobs and companies
does not support any of these well-worn myths. Consider the belief
that drivers are chronic malcontents. A 1988 study of job satisfac
tion among drivers did not support this. This survey found that on
average, truck drivers were as satisfied with their jobs as were any
other type of employee. Note the emphasis on the word “job.”
Drivers are satisfied with such aspects of their job as the feeling of
accomplishment it brings them, the freedom to use their own
judgement at work, and the opportunity to do different things from
time to time.
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Drivers are very dissatisfied, however, with the factors external
to their jobs. For example, drivers are very unhappy with the way
their supervisors handle them, with the way company policies are
implemented, with the lack of praise they receive, and with the
compensation received for the amount of work done. (This last
point should not be overly emphasized. Complaining about pay is a
common "smoke screen" for dissatisfaction with other parts of the
job. Turnover is not a consequence, solely, of low pay.) When
compared with other groups, drivers are particularly dissatisfied with
these external factors.
What is the critical lesson in these results? Drivers are dissatis
fied with the very things over which management can exercise the
most control. The overall control of dispatch, the relationship
between the drivers and the dispatcher, the respect (or lack thereof)
shown drivers by all levels of management, supervisory practices,
and unrealistic promises made during recruitment, can all be
improved dramatically in many firms. Perhaps the following ex
ample of such poor practices most succinctly illustrates the problems
in this area:
A driver from a central state developed problems with the
electrical system on his truck while dropping off a load in California.
His dispatcher had him constantly recharging the battery in an
attempt to bring the truck back to the company's central mainte
nance facility. After driving for two hours without lights in the dark,
the driver threatened to abandon the truck if repairs were not made
on the road. The repairs were finally authorized, but the driver,
who had an outstanding record, left both the firm and the industry.
In this instance, the dispatcher cost the company a very scarce,
expensive resource-the driver--in an effort to save a few dollars on
maintenance.
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Was it worth it? That is, was it cheaper to lose and replace (if
lucky!) a driver in order to save on repair costs? In answering this
question, consider the fact that the cost of replacing a driver is
assumed to be around $5,000. Also, keep in mind that this figure
probably is quite low, especially when the potential damage costs of
a new, "inexperienced driver" as opposed to a long-time "pro" are
considered. Could a fully loaded rig be replaced for $5,000?
Would $5,000 settle a personal injury lawsuit brought by a motorist
injured by the new driver? Now answer the question: was it worth
it?

SUMMARY
The motor carrier industry is experiencing a crisis that can
fundamentally and perhaps permanently retard its growth. Yet there
are a number of proactive, relatively inexpensive steps the industry
can take in response to this problem. New, targeted help-wanted
advertisements, innovative programs for in-house driver training, and
revised, enlightened managerial techniques, are ways to begin
combatting this problem.
A key question, however, is will firms be willing to make the
kinds of financial and managerial commitments required for these
new practices? But perhaps more basic than even this, is the
question of whether management is willing to expend the energy
required to reorient the firms? Will the industry continue "as is,"
and watch profit margins and market shares continue to decline? In
some ways, this is the "life and death" question facing motor
carriers. The answer not only will affect this industry, but also will
exert a significant impact on the total U.S. economy.
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AIRLINE MERGER POLICY AND ENTRY BARRIERS:
A LESSON EROM THE PAST

by
Matthew V. Scocozza
McNair Law Firm

INTRODUCTION
Many criticisms have been voiced about the U.S. Department of
Transportation's oversight of the airline merger authority under
Section 408 of the Federal Aviation Act. The Department of Trans
portation inherited this function from the Civil Aeronautics Board on
the occasion of that agency's sunset on December 31,1984. On
January 1, 1989, Section 408 of the Federal Aviation Act was sunset.
Airline mergers are now governed by the general antitrust laws of
the United States as administered by the U.S. Department of Justice.
This paper is designed to give an inside look at each of the
mergers approved during the DOT era as well as the basis upon
which the decisions were made. Since review of barriers to entry
was of critical importance in the DOT review process, a primary
focus of this paper will be on barriers to entry. Since this paper will
touch upon acquisitions as well as mergers, I will use the term
"merger" to refer to both types of transactions.
This document will respond to criticisms voiced in the past as
well as review the important market by market analyses undertaken
by staff and decisionmakers. All too often critics have been quick to
judge the DOT perion of merger review by the "numbers" of cases
approved, revised, or disapproved. Responsible reviews of the
decisions should be made after an analysis of the specific circum-
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stances surrounding each case. Only when there is a clear and
informed understanding of past merger decisions can there be a
sound basis for the continued development of airline merger policy.
This paper will also briefly address two other developments that
some may argue should play a greater role in entry barrier analysis in
the airline industry -- airline owned computer reservations systems
or "CRSs" and special arrangements, referred to as code-sharing
agreements, between large carriers and selected smaller feeder
carriers. These developments may also have relevance to the
discussion on exclusionary conduct which follows.

AIRLINE MERGER POLICY AND ENTRY BARRIERS
The CAB's and Department's review of airline mergers has been
governed by Section 408 of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958.1
Section 408 (b) establishes the standard for review that is to be
applied. Before deregulation, Section 408 (b) conferred on the CAB
broad discretion to approve or disapprove airline mergers under a
"public interest" test. Maintenance of competition was not always
the CAB's highest priority in applying this test When Congress
enacted the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978,2 it amended Section
408 to reflect its decision that the airline industry should be gov
erned by the forces of the marketplace, not by federal economic
regulations. Although Congress retained the public interest test, it
added a specific competitive test3 Section 408 required the Depart
ment to approve a merger 1) that will not result in a monopoly or
further an attempted monopoly and that will not likely lessen com
petition substantially in any region of the United States and 2) that is
not inconsistent with the public interest Section 408 requires the
Department to disapprove a merger that does not meet these
standards, unless DOT found that it met significant transportation
needs and conveniences of the public that cannot be met through
any reasonably available alternative transaction that would be

58

journal of Transportation Management

materially less anti-competitive.4 Parties challenging a transaction
bore the burden of proving its anti-competitive effects.5
The competitive test of Section 408 was very similar to that of
Section 7 of the Clayton Act. For the record, the CAB and DOT
have never approved an anti-competitive merger under the trans
portation needs and conveniences test. The Department, therefore,
applied standards established under Section 7 in their review of
airline mergers. Under Section 7, review of a merger must consist of
a "functional analysis" which includes a consideration of an indus
try's structure, history and future, according to the Brown Shoe and
General Dynamics decisions and their progeny.6
In reviewing mergers, the CAB and, DOT attempted to deter
mine whether the merger would provide carriers market power
enabling them to charge fares above, or reduce service below,
competitive levels. This is also the central inquiry in Clayton Act
cases in other industries. However, the method of analysis for other
industries frequently may differ from that employed for the airline
industry. Most Clayton Act cases involve industries where new entry
is unlikely. The courts therefore assume that a significant increase in
market shares or concentration statistics substantial lessening of
competition unless the proponents of a merger can show otherwise.
In contrast, both the CAB and the Department have found that high
concentration statistics are not themselves reliable indicators of
market power in the airline industry, especially concentration
statistics in individual city-pair markets. This position was based on
the belief that in the absence of constraints on entry, carriers can
enter individual city-pair markets relatively easily. Before deregula
tion proved to be one of the biggest constraints on entry. Once this
barrier was removed, the threat of potential entry could discipline
the service of carriers actually in a market. This belief in turn was
not based solely on theoretical musing, but on the CAB's real-world
observations in some of its earliest decisions such as the National
Acquisition and the Texas International-Continental Cases that
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“Airline markets are nearly always concentrated by traditional
antitrust standards, yet most are competitive in performance."7
Therefore, in the CAB merger cases cited (among others), and in
concentrated on the Department's own merger decisions, such as
the Southwest-Muse and Northwest-Republic cases, bother agencies
concentrated on determining whether any entry barriers that would
justify inferring a loss of competition from a substantial increase in
concentration existed in the specific markets at issue.8 And since the
agencies drew no presumptions from concentration statistics, they
looked to merger opponents to demonstrate the existence of entry
barriers or otherwise to show anti-competitive effects. The Depart
ment discussed this issue at some length in the Northwest-Republic
case.9
One of the most significant developments in airline operations
in a deregulated environment has been the establishment of huband-spoke route networks. In hub-and-spoke networks, airlines
serve many routes emanating from a common hub. By combining
local traffic flying between the hub and each spoke end-point with
traffic flying between different end-points, airlines lower their per
passenger costs of operating any specific flight segment. Hub and
spoke operations permit airlines to serve smaller local markets that
could not sustain service with local traffic alone. In addition, airlines
compete vigorously with each other for passengers moving between
the same pairs of spoke end-points by offering single-plane or
connecting service over alternate hubs. The growth of hub and
spoke operations have clearly benefited many airline customers.
However, it has also generated controversy in airline merger cases.
Since one of the CAB's earliest merger decisions under the
Deregulation Act, opponents, including the Justice Department in
some cases, have contended that the efficiencies of hubbing are so
substantial that control of feed or “hub dominance" is an entry
barrier in hub city-pair markets. The CAB never seriously doubted
that access to feed was a relative efficiency factor that could reduce
a hubbing carrier's per passenger costs. However, the CAB also
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found, based on the evidence before it, that other factors — such as
lower operating costs, strong local traffic demand, reliance on onestop or connecting service to compete with non-stop service, or feed
from their own hubs — would permit carriers to enter successfully
hub city-pair markets served by a carrier with hub dominance.
Therefore, the CAB consistently concluded that the benefits of feed
were not so large as to preclude the threat of competition from
disciplining a carrier with hub dominance. Again, the CAB's conclu
sion was based on hard evidence from the real world. In each case,
the Board had before it examples of carriers actually serving hub
city-pair markets that they should not have been serving if hub
dominance really were a barrier to entry. The National Acquisition
and Continental-Western merger cases are good examples.10
The hub dominance issue was hotly contested in DOT merger
cases as well, especially those involving combinations of carriers that
had hubbing operations in the same city, such as the NorthwestRepublic (Minneapolis/St. Paul and Detroit) and TWA-Ozark (St.
Louis) cases.11 The Justice Department opposed each of these
mergers. In approving them, the Department determined that the
record did not support the Justice Department's contention that
competitors could not use other advantages, such as those outlined
above, to match the benefits of hub - dominance and enter the hub
carrier's markets. Again, the Department had evidence of carriers
actually operating where they should not have been if hub domi
nance really impeded entry.12
Some observers have made much of the fact the Justice Depart
ment and Department of Transportation took such diametrically
opposed positions on these mergers. I think these observers have
read more into these differences then they fairly should. Out of
twenty-odd major merger decisions by the Department, the TWAOzark and Northwest-Republic transactions were the only two that
the Department approved when the Justice Department urged
outright disapproval.13 The Justice Department reached its position
in part because it relied on the traditional antitrust notion that
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increased concentration implies loss of competition and in part
because it believed that one-stop or connecting service was not
competitive with non-stop service. DOT did not find that the record
supported either contention. At the risk of oversimplifying, DOT
found its expertise in the airline industry, supported by the records
in the cases, to be a more reliable than the Justice Department's
general antitrust expertise.
The hub dominance issue arose again in the USAir-Piedmont
case, even though there were no overlapping hubs.14 The Justice
Department did not challenge the merger, but another carrier, the
America West Airlines did. The carrier submitted evidence on the
correlation of fare levels in individual city-pair markets to a dominant
carrier's share of enplanements at the end points of the city-pairs. It
claimed that this statistical analysis showed that hub dominance
provided market power to allow the dominant carrier to raise fares.
In addition, its experts claimed that various business practices that
arose in the deregulated environment -- such as frequent flyer
programs, CRSs, override commissions for travel agents and sophisti
cated discount fare capacity control programs -- might give such
large advantage to hubbing airline as to be barriers to entry in hub
city-pair markets. I believe that they may have been following a lead
suggested by Professor Mike Levine in his article in the Yale lournal
on Regulation.15
The Department carefully reviewed these contentions and the
record in the case. It found that the statistical analysis was flawed
and therefore could not be relied on to demonstrate that hub
dominance conferred market power. With respect to Professor
Levine's article, I think he has raised some interesting theoretical and
analytical questions which probably deserve consideration in the
review of any future airline mergers. However, the Department
makes its, merger decision based on the characteristics of the airlines
and the markets in the particular case before it. In the USAirPiedmont case, the Department found that any competitive advan
tages that the business practices gave to USAir or Piedmont were not
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so large as to make the practices entry barriers in the markets
affected by the USAir-Piedmont transaction. I don't think anyone
would seriously argue that the ability of a carrier like American to
offer frequent flyers free travel to numerous European and Carib
bean destinations also allows it to compete effectively against USAir's
frequent-flyer program, even in cities like Syracuse where USAir
enjoys a strong presence. Some of these business practices may even
facilitate entry or expansion.
Limitations on airport access are the other potential entry barrier
that the CAB and DOT have most frequently considered in merger
cases. These limitations may take two forms: (1) the lack of terminal
or other ground facilities to accommodate increased service; and (2)
regulatory ceilings on the number of flights permitted to operate at
an airport. Federal restrictions on the number of operations at four
airports ("slots") — Laguardia and John F. Kennedy International
airports in New York, Chicago O'Hare and Washington National —
are the most well known of the latter category, but some airports
have succeeded in imposing their own limits as well.
Limitations on terminal facilities have been most frequently cited
by merger opponents as entry barriers in cases where hub domi
nance was also a central issue, such as the Continental-Western,
Northwest-Republic, and TWA-Ozark cases. In each of these cases
opponents argued that a potential entrant needed the ability to es
tablish its own hub at the affected city in order to exercise effective
competitive discipline over the merging carrier's hub operation and
that there were insufficient ground facilities to permit a new hub.
Generally speaking, the agencies have agreed that the affected
airports did not have adequate facilities to permit immediate entry
on a hub scale. However, the agencies found that there were
adequate facilities to permit entry on a lesser scale. As the earlier
discussion of hub dominance suggests, the agencies also found the
threat of entry on less than a hub scale to be sufficient to provide
effective competitive discipline. Therefore, the agencies have not
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found limitations on airport ground facilities to be entry barriers.16 In
the TWA-Ozark case, one carrier, Southwest Airlines, did have
access to sufficient ground facilities to support a hubbing operation.
When the Department considered whether slots are an entry
barrier it usually focused on the New York and Washington slotcontrolled airports. Each of these airports serves a metropolitan area
that also receives substantial air service through at least one airport
that is not under slot restrictions. With one exception, the records
before the Department showed that services at the airports without
slot constraints were part of the same market as services at the slotconstrained airports. Therefore, existing or potential service at the
unrestricted airports provided competitive discipline for services at
the slot constrained airports. The Department accordingly found
that slots were not an entry barrier requiring disapproval of the
mergers. The USAir-Piedmont case is an example.
The exception which proves the rule, the Texas Air-Eastern case,
involved unique circumstances. The merger involved the combina
tion of the two competitors in the Northeast Corridor air shuttle
markets (Washington National-Laguardia and Laguardia-Boston).
The Department found that these markets were airport specific and
that a competitor would have to provide hourly service to compete
effectively in the markets. The Department found that in these
circumstances slots were an entry barrier and it refused to approve
the acquisition until the applicants gave up enough slots to Pan
American to mount a competitive shuttle operation.17 In this case,
the Department agreed with the Justice Department that there were
competitive problems that needed to be fixed before the transaction
could be approved.
Before turning away from mergers I would like to address two
points recently raised by critics of past merger policy. First, they
suggest that the relative stability in market shares of merging carriers
at their hubs indicates that their hub dominance has insulated them
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from competition. Second, they suggest that recent trends toward
fare increases may be manifestations of a loss of competition in the
industry. To infer a lessening of competition in the airline industry
from either phenomenon requires a leap of faith that isn't justified.
Concerning market shares, as even the Justice Department
acknowledges, immediate new entry is not required, and should not
be expected, in order to exert competitive discipline on incumbents
in an airline market. Three hubs affected by DOT approved mergers,
Minneapolis St. Paul, Detroit and St. Louis has each seen entry by
new carriers and expansion by incumbents other than the merging
carriers. As to fares, the downward movement in fares for much of
the last two years coincided with dramatic decreases in the price of
aviation fuel, which is the second largest component of airline
operating expenses. In recent months, aviation fuel prices have
stabilized or started to rise. In addition, many airlines have made
commitments for, or started to take delivery on, large orders for new
aircraft. These aircraft must be paid for. Thus, the recent upward
trend in fares reflect no more than a change in airline cost structures
Turning to CRSs, the affiliations of the five U.S. travel agent CRSs
with airlines has been a subject of controversy ever since the CAB
first examined the issue. In its CRS rulemaking,18 the CAB found that
CRS operators used their CRSs to increase their share of sales by
agents subscribing to their CRS services at the expense of their airline
competitors. This phenomenon is referred to as the generation of
incremental revenues. The CAB found that by generating incre
mental revenues, CRS operators could reduce their own unit costs of
providing airline service while raising the costs of their airline
competitors. The CAB also found that airline economics and
distribution practices required airlines to be listed in any CRS that
had gained significant penetration in the travel agent industry.
Therefore, the CAB found that CRSs were analogous to essential
facilities under the antitrust laws.

Volume I, Number I

65

Based on its findings, the CAB adopted regulations that reduced
CRS Operators' ability to generate incremental revenues with their
systems.19 The rules also required the operators to give access to
their CRSs to other airlines on non-discriminatory terms and at nondiscriminatory prices.20
The CRS rulemaking has proven to be far from the last word on
CRSs. A number of airlines have filed private antitrust actions against
the airline affiliates of the largest CRSs, American and United.21 A
key issue in those cases is whether CRSs should be classified as
essential facilities.
As I noted earlier, the opponent of the USAir-Piedmont merger
argued that CRSs might be an entry barrier. The Department
rejected this argument in part because neither USAir nor Piedmont
at that time owned a CRS. Since the Department's decision, USAir
has agreed to join a group of four foreign airlines to purchase a fiftypercent interest in United's CRS.22
The Department very recently issued its study of the CRS
industry. The Department's study is probably the most comprehen
sive -- it is certainly the longest -- since the CAB's rulemaking.
Nevertheless, I do not believe that the study itself can answer all
questions about the current effects of airline-CRS affiliation in entry
barrier analysis for airline mergers. Among other things, the study
suggests that CRSs continue to generate some incremental revenues
for their airline affiliates, but precise determination of the amounts
and causes of incremental revenues was not possible. CRSs also
earn substantial fee payments from airlines that are listed in their
displays. It would not, however, be fair to infer from these findings
alone that CRSs benefit their airline affiliates so much that competi
tive discipline in the airline industry has been materially eroded.
Even if CRSs do create some advantages for their airline affiliates,
they also provide other carriers with convenient, quick and reliable
access to the nationwide distribution network represented by travel
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agents. To the extent that CRS participation allows carriers to avoid
using other more costly distribution methods, CRSs may enhance
competition.23
Code-sharing agreements also have been the subject of much
discussion lately. Code-sharing agreements are arrangements in
which a commuter carrier's flights are listed in schedules and CRSs
under the airline designator code of a large jet operator. The large
airline usually enters into these agreements to provide additional
feed support from smaller communities to its hubs. In addition to
sharing codes, the commuter services will often be marketed under a
trade name closely aligned with the name of the jet carrier, for
example American Eagle or United Express. Connecting flights
between the parties to code-sharing agreements receive the same
priority as true single-carrier connections in CRS schedule displays.
In addition, the jet operators offer joint fare arrangements to their
code-sharing partners that are more favorable than those they offer
to other commuters.
Although they have been part of the industry since the 1960's
they had not generated much controversy until the 1980's when
they began to proliferate. You need only look at the comments on
code-sharing in two rulemaking dockets, CAB Dockets 42199 and
41686 to appreciate the intensity of this controversy.24 Independent
commuters have claimed that they cannot effectively compete
against code-sharing commuters because of the benefits of improved
CRS listings and the special joint fare arrangements. When the
Department completed its study of code-sharing in early 198625 the
evidence available to it did not support these contentions. The data
relied on at that time suggested that independent commuters
continued to play a substantial role in serving smaller communities
and that they were effectively competing head-to-head against code
sharing commuters in many markets. However, later data suggested
that the benefits of code-sharing may place independent commuters
at a disadvantage, and that independents are declining as a force in
the market.26
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Although code-sharing arrangements may increase the costs or
risks of entry by independent commuters, I believe it is fair to
consider them as much entry tools as entry barriers. Increasingly, jet
operators are including code-sharing arrangements as part of their
program for establishing new hubs. United arranged for initiation of
United Express service at American Eagle service when it opened its
Raleigh-Durham and Nashville hubs. The Department has found in
a number of merger decisions, including the Northwest-Republic
and Alaska Airlines- Horizon cases,27 that participation in a code
sharing arrangement may facilitate a commuter carrier's entry or
expansion into markets around a hub.

CONCLUSION
The sponsors have reminded me that the purpose of this
symposium is to suggest lessons that general antitrust practitioners
might draw from the experiences of deregulated industries. Let me
close by suggesting at least one lesson to be gleaned from both the
CAB's and Department's experiences with airline mergers. It is
critically important for the decision-maker passing judgement on a
merger to thoroughly understand the nature of the industry and
markets, and the characteristics of competition and the competitors,
and affected by a proposed merger before applying the competitive
standards of the Clayton Act. Presumptions or even conclusions that
have been drawn about the nature of competition for some indus
tries or markets may not be readily transferable to others. As
antitrust practitioners, you can best contribute to sound antitrust
policy by assuring that the decision-maker is presented with the
information that will permit the thorough understanding necessary
for well-reasoned and reasonable decisions.
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THE IMPACT OF AIRLINE SIZE
UPON EFFICIENCY AND PROFITABILITY
by
H. Barry Spraggins
University of Nevada-Reno

INTRODUCTION
With the enactment of the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978,
deregulation of the nation's airlines officially began in 1979.1 De
regulation of the airlines was accompanied by a series of setbacks:
fuel prices more than doubled between 1978 and 1981, and the
surge in costs, coupled with the 1981-1982 recession, inflicted huge
losses on the industry. The 1981 air-traffic controller strike and the
aftermath of firing of more than 11,000 air-traffic controllers sharply
restricted the number of flights at the large U.S. airports. Airlines
stretched out or cancelled plane orders and even grounded part of
their fleets.2 Also adding to the chaos was the entrance of new
airlines such as Peoples Express.3
Following the 1978 banner sear of S1.365 billion in operating
profits, the U.S. airline industry lost nearly $1.4 billion from 1980
through 1982.4 Profits reached S310 million in 1983, about $2.1
billion in 1984, around $1.4 billion in 1985, $1.3 in 1986, and a
record $2.46 billion in 1987.5'6,7'8
The overall airline recovery since 1983 is attributed to a number
of factors. Among them, fuel prices which account for one quarter
of an airline's operating expenses, have remained more stable.
Many airlines have received concessions from their labor forces.
Tough cost cutting measures have been implemented. The wiser
use of new routes has been a contributor, and a strong economy
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during this period has also had a very positive effect on the airlines.9
This recovery follows on the heels of a post-deregulation transition
which saw competitive forces challenge the market dominance of
established carriers.
Even with the good profits of recent years for air carriers as a
group, certain individual airlines such as Eastern have not shared in
the gains. Also on the negative side, statistics show that 21 of 36
airlines certified before deregulation are no longer operating, 84 of
all new entrant airlines since deregulation no longer exist. These
changes have resulted from merger, liquidation, and decertifica
tion.10'11'12'13'14
The effect of size or scale on economic performance is a key
aspect of the economies of business enterprise and industrial
organization. The trend with the passage of time for companies to
become larger through mergers as well as growth makes it of
particular interest to obtain objective measures of the economies or
diseconomies and other effects of increasing scale.
The key question to be answered in this paper is whether size
has been associated with improved efficiency and profitability. This
paper attempts to analyze efficiency and profitability difference of
U.S. airlines according to firm size within a segment of the U.S.
airline industry. This is a topic of current importance because of the
great structural changes, particularly mergers, that have occurred in
the airline industry since deregulation and the implications for future
optimum airline size that would best serve the public interest and
the nation's need for a dependable and efficient airline industry.

AIRLINE TRENDS
An examination of several airline operating characteristics is an
appropriate beginning for the analysis. Table 1 shows relevant
airline operating statistics from 1978 through 1988.15>16,17
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Graphically, it can be seen in Figure 1 and Figure 2 that both
revenue-passenger miles and available seat miles have each risen
around 60 percent since the slump of 1981. The trend for both
since 1981 has been a relatively smooth upward movement.
Due to the nature of the airline industry, high fixed costs made
marginal revenue/additional revenue contribution an important
aspect of operating income. Thus, advantage of increasing demand
by the traveling public.
In Figure 3, the load factor which is a result of available seat miles
being divided by revenue-passenger miles, has been erratic over the
time period. After climbing to a high of 63% in 1979, just when
deregulation was to take effect, it fell sharply in 1980 to 59%. Since
1981, although the individual years have been inconsistent, the trend
has been upward. A post-deregulation higher level of 62.7% was
reached in 1988.
The operating ratio, the amount of operating revenue used for
operating expenses, has varied considerably since 1978. It has ranged
from a low of 97% in pre-deregulation 1978 to a high of 102% in 1982.
Since 1982 the airlines have succeeded in returning the ratio to a more
profitable level. Figure 4 shows the ratio.
From Figure 5, operating income dropped drastically after 1978
to a deficit of minus 5733,435,000 in 1982. This drop was probably
due to a combination of factors ranging from price competition on
competing routes among the carriers in a deregulated environment to
the economic climate. After 1982, operating income returned to
profitable levels. In 1987, the carriers as a whole realized their highest
operating income on record.
In addition to collective airline operating statistics, individual
airline operating characteristics such as market share, merger trends,
and the interface between these two elements are germane to this
analysis. Market shares of enplanementsfor all of the major U.S. airlines
from 1978 through 1987 are shown in Table 2.18
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TABLE 1
AIRLINE INDUSTRY OPERATING STATISTICS 1978-1988
REVENUE PASSENGER

AVAILABLE

LOAD FACTOR

OPERATING

OPERATING

OPERATING

OPERATING

MILES (000)

SEAT MILES (000)

%

REVENUE (000)

EXPENSES (000)

RATIO

INCOME (000)

1978
1979

226,781,368
262,023,375

368,750,530
416,126,429

61.50%
63.00%

22,883,955
27,226,665

21,519,092
27,026,610

0.940
0.993

1,364,863
200,055

1980
1981

255,192,114
248,887,801

432,535,103
424,897,230

59.00%
58.60%

36,662,555
36,662,555

33,949,421
37,117,325

1.007
1.012

(221,615)
(454,770)

1982
1983

259,643,870
281,829,148

440,119,206
464,537,979

59.00%
60.70%

36,407,635
38,953,672

37,141,070
38,643,262

1.020
0.992

(733,435)
310,410

1984
1985

304,458,727
336,403,021

514,010,029
547,788,432

59.20%
61.40%

43,825,047
46,664,414

41,673,536
45,238,150

0.951
0.969

2,151,511
1,426,264

1986
1987

366,283,158
404,307,784

606,847,601
648,414,398

60.40%
62.40%

50,524,933
57,020,400

49,201,832
54,561,111

0.974
0.957

1,323,101
2,459,289

1988

411,628,429

656,866,299

62.70%

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

YEAR
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FIGURE 2
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TABLE 2
U.S. AIRLINES PERCENT MARKET SHARE OF ENPLANEMENTS 1978-1987

1978

1979

1980

1981

1982

1983

1984

1985

1986

1987

United
American
Eastern

14.95
10.20
13.91

11.38
9.98
13.75

11.27
9.00
13.77

10.03
9.10
13.22

11.84
9.99
12.66

12.57
10.43
12.99

12.82
10.67
11.91

10.87
11.56
11.70

12.96
11.83
10.84

13.21
11.63
11.60

Delta
Piedmont
U.S. Air

13.32
1.66
4.72

12.96
1.76
4.62

13.44
1.99
4.95

12.89
2.60
4.89

12.16
3.07
5.29

12.22
3.69
5.36

11.68
4.46
5.33

11.15
5.06
5.40

13.67
5.85
5.57

13.46
5.77
5.44

3.42
3.40
7.25

3.74
3.18
7.26

4.01
2.83
7.10

4.13
3.11
6.67

4.10
3.63
6.30

4.22
3.40
6.19

4.13
3.48
5.78

4.09
4.52
3.84

5.24
5.23
6.14

9.29
9.56
5.62

___

1.82
—

—

1.70

4.14
—
2.58

6.21
0.30
2.85

6.51
1.02
3.26

6.30
2.23
3.58

4.75
3.07
3.77

4.80
4.14
3.70

3.77
3.38
3.33

___

...

—
2.83

3.19
4.09

2.88
3.85

5.30
3.44

5.62
3.41

4.43
3.61

4.69
3.73

4.05
3.33

3.65
3.39

3.20

3.19

—

—

...

2.76

2.09

2.26

2.56

2.69

2.45

2.53

2.73

2.66

Northwest
Continental
Transworld
Republic
People Express
Southwest
Pan Am
Western
Pacific
Southwest

TABLE 2 CONTINUED
U.S. AIRLINES PERCENT MARKET SETARE OE ENPLANEMENTS 1978-1987

1978

1979

1980

American West
Air Cal
Frontier

0.92
2.10

0.92
2.10

1.03
2.10

Ozark
Flawaiian
Aloha

1.09
1.39
1.02

1.30
1.22
0.90

Braniff
National
Hughes Airwest

4.2!>
2.57
2.30

North Central
Southern
Texas Inti.

2.48
1.51
1.47

1986

1987

1982

1983

1984

1985

1.29
2.33

1.23
2.11

0.10
1.18
2.10

0.75
1.25
2.20

1.44
1.25
1.92

1.83
1.29
1.18

1.20
1.10
0.94

1.54
1.08
0.97

1.00
1.14
0.98

1.01
0.80
0.72

1.55
0.94
0.74

1.50
0.94
0.70

1.00
1.00
0.73

4.02
2.12
1.02

4.23

3.87

1.41

___

___

___

...

—

...

...

—

...

...

...

1.31

—

—

...

...

...

...

...

1.20
0.71
1.49

___

___

___

___

___

___

___

___

—

—

...

—

—

—

...

...

1.51

1.38

1.19

—

...

...

—

...

Source: Air Transport World, Jan. 1, 1988, p. 11.

1981

2.39
1.31
...

—

1.15
0.78
___

It is clear that most of the large carriers already operating before
1978, lost traffic share after deregulation, especially during the initial
years of deregulation. United Airlines has to yet regain the share
enjoyed before deregulations. American's share was below 1978
levels until 1985. The 1985-1986 increase was due partly to the
strikes at United and TWA in those years. But the fact remains that it
did not surpass its 1978 share level until 1985, six years after
deregulation. Eastern has seen a fairly steady erosion of its market
share since 1978. In addition to the problems encountered by all
airlines in the deregulated environment, Eastern has encountered a
multitude of other problems, not the least being labor and its
interface with non-union sister Continental. Delta has also experi
enced a steady decline of market share since deregulation. Only
because of the merger with Western does Delta's share show a
significant increase beginning with 1986. Piedmont and U.S. Air are
two smaller carriers that have been able to gain market share during
this era of deregulation. Northwest Airlines was able to increase
market share during the initial years of deregulation even before it
merged with Republic. Much of this increase was due to its interna
tional operations, where deregulation did not apply. In fact, during
the period from 1979 to 1985 its domestic traffic actually declined.
Continental's share has increased since deregulation; a significant
share was gained at the expense of Eastern. TWA even after the
merger with Ozark in 1986 has continued to show an erosion in
market share. Pan American merged with National in January 1980.
Following their merger, their combined traffic share has declined in
every subsequent year. For the airlines formed since deregulation
the results have been mixed. Peoples Express was merged into
Texas Air. American West has steadily increased its share since
inception. The case is similar for Air Cal.
Market share can also be viewed from the perspective of
individual airports. Before deregulation, C.A.B. studies showed that
the ideal competitive balance at major airports was three carriers
with full flight schedules. Today, however, more than half of the
flights in an increasing number of cities are provided by a single car
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rier. For example, Northwest controls over 80% of the gates at
Minneapolis; U.S. Air has more than an 80% share at Pittsburgh;
Piedmont 80% at Charlotte; and United and Continental share most
of the gates at Denver.
Market share whether from the perspective of air carrier
Enplanement or individual airport gate dominance has been signifi
cantly impacted by the wave of airline mergers since deregulation.
Between May 1985 and December 1987 alone, twenty-four
acquisitions and mergers involving U.S. airlines operating jet aircraft
in scheduled passenger service occurred. Among the more signifi
cant mergers or acquisitions during this period were American and
Air California; Delta and Western; Eastern, Continental, Peoples
Express, Frontier, New York Air, and Butt; Northwest and Republic;
Trans World and Ozark. Seven major carriers are all that remain
today of the eleven trunk carriers that existed in 1978. These seven
carriers account for over 86% of the total market share of all U.S.
airlines.19

METHODOLOGY
The study examined 13 domestic airlines.20'21-22< 23-24,25'26 All of
the majors were included except pan Am and Continental. Alaskan
and Hawaiian airlines were also included in the data. The years
1978 through 1987 were analyzed. Because deregulation took
effect in 1979, 1978 was chosen as a starting point for a pre
deregulation comparison with the deregulated years since.
In an attempt to obtain a measure of firm size, three different
representations were used: total assets, available seat miles, and
number of employees. It was hoped that if a significant relationship
was masked by a weakness in one indicator of size, analysis of one
or more of the other standard would lead to more meaningful re
sults. Profitability in this study was measured by operating income
which is the operating revenue less operating expenses. Efficiency
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was measured by the operating ratio. The operating ratio is the
proportion of operating revenues consumed by operating expenses.
This is a good statistic for a firm's relative performance on the
question of cost versus revenue. It is generally thought to be one of
the best indicators of operating efficiency.
Correlation and regression analysis of firm size in relation to
various profitability measures were the prime analytical tools used.
The major question examined in this paper is quite simple. As the
size of an airline increases, does operating efficiency increase or
decrease and does profitability increase or decrease more than
proportionately with adjustments in airline size?

FINDINGS OF THE ANALYSIS
Results of the correlation analysis of the 13 airlines examined
from 1978 through 1987 are presented in Table 3. Looking at the
airline profitability in terms of operating income and the influence
size has on this profitability, the three representative measures of
airline size generally tended to follow the same pattern. When total
assets are used as predictor of operating income, significant correla
tions are found for the pre-deregulation year of 1978 and for the
years of 1984-1987. For the years 1979-1983 correlations are very
weak or nonexistent. Figure 6 shows the regression of this relation
ship for 1987.
The relationship of available seat miles to operating income
produces mixed results over the years. Available seat miles provides
predictability of operating income for 1978, 1984, 1985, and 1987.
No significant correlations were found for the intervening years.
Figure 7 reflects this relationship for 1987.
Using number of employees to predict operating income was
not conclusive. The years 1978, 1984 and 1985 showed good
relationships. In 1987 some relationship existed, but the other years
were very weak. Figure 8 shows the weak relationship in 1987.
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TABLE 3
CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS (R2) 13 INDIVIDUAL AIRLINES

Operating Income
1 978

1 ‘>79

1 980

1981

1982

1 983

1984

1985

1986

1987

Total
Assets

75.5
S.

7.4
N.S

22.6
N.S.

4.1
N.S.

28.2
N.S

5.5
N.S.

80.5
S.

70.2
S.

35.9
S.

61.3
S.

Available
Seat Miles

70.7
S.

2.2
N.S.

22.6
N.S.

2.2
N.S.

32.5
N.S.

32.5
NS

2.3
N.S.

52.9
S.

13.6
S.

40.3
S.

Employees

73.1
S.

3.2
N.S.

9.5
N.S.

1.1
N.S.

25.4
N.S.

0
N.S.

71.1
S.

52.7
S.

14.8
N.S.

37.0
S.

S = The correlation is statistically significant.
N.S. = The correlation is not statistically significant.

TABLE 3 CONTINUED
CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS (R2) 13 INDIVIDUAL AIRLINES

Operating Ratio
1980

1983

1984

1985

1986

1987

1978

1979

Total
Assets

31.4
S.

10.3
N.S

0
N.S.

0.1
N.S.

0.1
N.S

0.9
N.S.

12.4
N.S.

0
N.S.

2.3
N.S.

2.1
N.S.

Available
Seat Miles

29.3
S.

1.7
N.S.

.1
N.S.

0
N.S.

0.2
N.S.

0
N.S

10.1
N.S.

0.4
N.S.

0.1
N.S.

0
N.S.

Employees

28.6
S.

6.9
N.S.

0.4
N.S.

1.3
N.S.

0.1
N.S.

0
N.S.

6.7
N.S.

3.5
N.S.

12.2
N.S.

0
N.S.

S = The correlation is statistically significant.
N.S. = The correlation is not statistically significant.

1981

1982

(Millions)

OPERATING INCOME (DOLLARS)
(Times 10Eg)
TOTAL ASSETS (DOLLARS)
■ ACTUAL POINTS

+ REGRESSION POINTS

FICURE 7
AVAILABLE SEAT MILES VS. OPERATING INCOME
1987

8

OPERATING INCOME (DOLLARS)
(Millions)
(Times 10Eg)
AVAILABLE SEAT MILES
■ ACTUAL POINTS

+ REGRESSION POINTS

Generally, the lower the operating ratio, the better the chance
for operating efficiency. When using the three representations of
firm size to predict efficiency in operations as indicated by the
operating ratio, virtually none of the measures, total assets, available
seat miles, or number of employees, indicated any significant
relationships for any of the years except 1978. In 1978 a somewhat
weak relationship between the three size measures and operating
ratio was found. Figure 9 shows an example of the "scatter" of
available seat miles for 1987
Some general observations concerning the individual airlines in
recent years, namely 1985, 1986 and 1987, should be noted. The
largest airline in terms of assets, American, has consistently shown
the highest operating income during this period. The airline with the
smallest assets, Hawaiian, has had the lowest or next to lowest
operating income during the period. The airlines with the highest
available seat miles during these years have not had the highest
operating income, but the airlines with the fewest available seat
miles have generally had the lowest operating income. The airlines
with the largest number of employees have not had the highest op
erating income, but the airlines with the fewest number of employ
ees have had the lowest operating income.
As far as the relationship of size to operating ratio is concerned
during 1985, 1986 and 1987, American airlines with the most assets
in 1985 had one of the lowest operating ratios, but that subse
quently rose in 1986 and 1987. It might also be noted that in 1987
the airline with the smallest assets had the highest operating ratio.
The airline with the highest number of available seat miles in 1985,
United, also had the highest operating ratio of 1.06. In 1987, the
airline with the lowest available seat miles, Hawaiian, had the
highest operating ratio. In 1985, the airline with the largest number
of employees had the highest operating ratio. In 1987 the airline
with the fewest number of employees, Hawaiian, had the highest
operating ratio.
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In an attempt to gain additional insight, the 13 airlines were
broken down into two groups for comparison in 1985 and again into
two groups in 1987, as shown in Table 4. For the 1985 grouping,
airlines with less than $4 billion in assets were grouped together and
those with assets in excess of $2 billion were grouped together. The
1987 groupings were based on airlines with assets in excess of $4
billion and those with less than $4 billion in assets. The year 1986
was excluded for comparison because of the numerous consolida
tions that occurred during the year.
For 1985 both size categories showed significant relationships
between "the three measures of size; total assets, available seat
miles, and employees; and operating income. A dichotomy appears
when the size measures are correlated with the efficiency measure
of operating ratio. The smaller sized carriers showed a significant
correlation between size measures and the operation ratio, but the
largest airlines reflected no relationship.
The differences become even more visible when a 1987
comparison is made. Generally, these two groupings are cases
where the larger carriers have become larger in 1987, primarily as a
result of mergers such as Delta and Western, and the smaller carriers
have shrunk in number. But the smaller carriers continue to show a
significant correlation between the of size and operating income.
FHowever, the larger carriers do not even show how a relationship
between size and operating income as they did in 1985. As in 1985
when it comes to a comparison between the two groups for size
measure and the relationship to operating ratio, the small carriers
have a positive relationship while the larger carriers have little or
none.
When the above groupings were compared on a basis of
averages, significant differences were even more apparent. Accord
ing to the computed Figures in Table 5, the smaller sized carriers
were more profitable in relation to their size measure than the larger
carriers in 1985. The small airlines had operating income equal to
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FIGURE 8
NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES VS. OPERATING INCOME

1987

OPERATING INCOM E (DOLLARS)
(M illions)
(Thousands)
NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES
■ ACTUAL POINTS

+ REGRESSION POINTS

FIGURE 9
AVAILABLE SEAT MILES VS. OPERATING RATIO
1987

OPERATING
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RATIO

(Times 10Eg)
AVAILABLE SEAT MILES
■ ACTUAL POINTS

* REGRESSION POINTS

TABLE 4
CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS (R2) 13 INDIVIDUAL AIRLINES - GROUPED

1985
Operating Income

Operating Ratio

Group I

Group II

Group I

Group II

Total
Assets

78.6
S.

86.6
S.

72.9
S.

5.1
N.S

Available
Seat Miles

69.3
S.

53.2
S.

51.4
S.

0
N.S.

Employees

90.4
S.

48.6
S.

76.0
S.

0
N.S.

Group I: Assets less than $2 Billion-Alaskan, Hawaiian, U.S. Air, Piedmont, Republic, Western, Ozark.
Group II: Assets more than $2 Billion-Eastern, TWA, Northwest, Delta, United, American.

TABLE 4 CONTINUED
CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS (R2) 13 INDIVIDUAL AIRLINES - GROUPED

1987
Operating Income
Group

III

Operating Ratio
Group

IV

Group III

Group

79.5
S.

9.5
N.S.

64.3
S.

20.2
N.S

Available
Seat Miles

90
S.

17.5
N.S.

57.1
S.

0
N.S.

Employees

78.8
S.

9.5
N.S.

56.7
S.

0
N.S.

Total
Assets

Group III: Assets less than $4 Billion-Alaskan, Hawaiian, U.S. Air, Piedmont.
Group IV: Assets more than $4 Billion-Eastern, TWA, Northwest, Delta, United, American.

IV

TABLE 5
COMPARATIVE OPERATING INCOME RATIOS OF STUDY GROUP

1985

Average
Average
Average
Average

Operating Income
Assests
Available Seat Miles
Number of Employees

Group I

Group II

$52,991,00
$926,578,420
11,520,540,000
8,336

$213,102,660
$4,060,905,500
47,785,756,000
35,174

1987
Average
Average
Average
Average

Operating Income
Assets
Available Seat Miles
Number of Employees

Group III

Group IV

$111,019,500
$1,412,606,500
12,371,715,000
10,071

$260,515,830
$5,454,687,300
61,168,176,600
46,970

1985
Group I

Operating Income as % of
Total Assests
Available Seat Miles Per $1 of
Operating Income Generated
Operating Income Generated
Per Employee

Group II

5,7%

5.2%

217,405

224,238

$6,356.89

$6,059.20

1987
Group III

Operating Income as % of
Total Assests
Available Miles Per $1 of
Operating Income Generated
Operating Income Generated
Per Employee
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Group IV

7.85%

4.85%

111,437

234,797

$11,025

$5,540
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5.7% of their total assets compared to 5.2% for the larger carriers.
The smaller carriers had available 217,405 seat miles for every dollar
of operating income generated while the larger carriers made
available 224,238 seat miles for every dollar of operating income
derived. The smaller carriers did a little better than larger ones
when operating income generated per employee was compared;
$6356.89 for smaller carriers vs. $6,059,20 for the larger airlines.
After significant growth of some large carriers in 1986 via
mergers and consolidations, the 1987 comparison gap for the two
groups widens even more. Smaller carriers show a 7.85% figure for
operating income as a percent of total assets while the larger carriers
drop to 4.8%. The available seat miles per $1 of operating income
generated drops to 111,437 for smaller carriers while it rises to
234,797 for the larger airlines. Operating income generated per
employee reflects an ever widening difference; up to $11,025 for
smaller airlines and down to $5,546 for larger carriers.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Since the enactment of the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, the
road to profitability for the airlines, both large and small, has been a
rough one. In recent years it seems to have smoothed out for most
of the carriers but with a strong economy as has been experienced
during recent years, it remains to be seen how the carriers will fare
once the economy takes on a downward trend. The fact remains
that up through 1987 the trend is positive for revenue passenger
miles, load factor, operating revenues, and operating income. And
the desired trend of down for the operating ratio seems to be in
place.
Airline market shares have taken significant turns since deregula
tion. Most of the larger carriers operating before deregulation lost
significant emplacement market share in the initial years after
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deregulation. Many of these carriers have not yet regained the level
they enjoyed before deregulation. Market share as far as gate
control is concerned has increased for most of these larger carriers.
Mergers and acquisitions since deregulation had a significant
impact on the airline industry structure. Seven major carriers exist
today in place of the eleven trunk carriers operating in 1978. Many
reasons can be cited for the recent wave of mergers - ranging from
competitive reasons to the need to obtain additional aircraft.
Whatever the reason, this consolidation of large carriers into even
larger carriers has had a significant impact on carrier profitability and
operating efficiency.
The major question asked in this paper is quite simple. As an air
carrier becomes larger, does it become more efficient, does it
become more profitable and do these increases occur more than
proportionally? Operating income was used as the profitability
measure. Operating ratio was the measure of efficiency. Total
assets, available seat miles, and number of employees were utilized
as indicators of airline size.
The analysis of profitability and efficiency according to the three
size measures of the 13 U.S. airlines studies revealed some interest
ing facts, but no simple answers. When examining the profitability
factor of operating income, all three size measures indicated a
significant correlation for 1978 and recent years. For the years 1979
through 1983, the three measures confirmed no correlation. The
reason for the sharp differences could be due to a number of factors.
Factors such as the initial chaos caused by deregulation, the econ
omy, statistical fluke, and others cannot be discounted. Based on
this data, the three measures of firm size are not reliable predictors
of a firm's operating efficiency. The fact that there is little or no
correlation seems to indicate that firms of all sizes can operate
efficiently or inefficiently. Larger firms do not necessarily have an
advantage.
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When the 13 carriers were broken down into two groups based
on size for 1985 and 1987, the differences between large and small
carriers became more apparent. In 1985 both size categories
showed significant correlation between size and operating profitabil
ity, but only the smaller sized carriers showed a significant relation
between size and operating efficiency. For 1987 the large carriers
failed to show any relationship between size and either operating
profitability or operating efficiency.
Examining differences between the two groups based on
averages confirmed the correlations. For 1985 the smaller carriers
fared better than larger carriers in terms of profitability and effi
ciency. In 1987 the gap was even wider between the two group
sizes, showing that the smaller carriers were both more profitable
and efficient based on all three measures of size.
It would appear from this analysis that the question of larger
airlines being more profitable and efficient is answered by a no. No
statistical evidence of constant returns to scale, much less economies
of scale exists. The correlation numbers generated for the larger
airlines are generally statistically insignificant.
Analysis of the data indicated that the larger firms had more
assets in relation to operating income than the smaller firms. That
the assets are proportionately above the small carriers when operat
ing profits are considered may imply that asset creation is being
financed by heavy borrowing. The bulge in assets coupled with a
higher operating ratio could also indicate that facilities are not being
effectively utilized. The larger carriers could possibly handle new
business with relatively little additional investment. That is to say, as
they grow larger, they are becoming less efficient.
By whatever means carriers grow, internal expansion, acquisi
tion, or merger, a number of major adjustments are inherent. The
expansion is usually financed through increased debt which in
creases interest expense. In the case of acquisition/merger there are
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expenses of rationalizing the combined fleet, consolidating mainte
nance activities, merging reservation systems, combining manage
ment, and dealing with union contracts. The additional non
operating expenses often cause total costs to go up more than total
revenues after intensive expansion, merger, or consolidation. All of
these adjustments take time and resources. It remains to be seen if
these "costs” will be rationalized in the long term.
The trend of airline consolidation forming larger and fewer
carriers should not come as a total surprise. The airlines are fulfilling
earlier predictions that only a handful of major carriers together with
some healthy regional and commuter airlines would ultimately
survive in the competitive intensity of a deregulated industry.
Airline industry officials have contended that competition will be
preserved even at airports controlled by a single carrier because of
the ample freedom for new airlines to enter the business. In such an
environment, they say, any airline that charges monopoly prices will
invite invasions of other carriers. But the major carriers are getting
better at using their vast resources, such as computerized reservation
systems, expansive flight schedules, and marketing resources to
dominate smaller competitors. The price of entry is going up!
Carriers are probably building barriers that competitors won't be
able to penetrate. They are trying to achieve the market dominance
that will give them better control of prices.
It would appear from this analysis that larger airlines are less
efficient and profitable in proportion to their size than the smaller
carriers. Because of the small sample in this analysis, further study is
needed on this issue to arrive at any definitive answers. Answers are
needed because of the important consequences for the future
structure of the airline industry and the resulting impact on fares and
service to the public if deregulation continues in its present form.
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BOOK REVIEWS

THE MANAGEMENT OF BUSINESS LOGISTICS. 4th Edition,
by John J. Coyle, Edward J. Bardi, and C. John Langley, Jr.,
(St. Paul: West Publishing Company, 1988). Pp. xxi, 631.
$36.50. ISBN 0-314-65263-9.

Maintaining a current working knowledge of logistics is an on
going challenge for both the practitioner and academician. Globali
zation of American business, changes in government regulations,
advancing technology, new directions in both strategic and opera
tional management techniques, and the search for differential ad
vantage all combine to make logistics one of the most dynamic
disciplines in business today. The 4th edition of Management of
Business Logistics meets this challenge or change by presenting an
expanded discipline in a practical, readable, current, and compre
hensive introductory textbook.
The fourth edition is almost 90 pages longer than the previous
edition and contains 1 7 chapters (2 more than previously) divided
into four parts. Part I (Chapter 1-4) provides the conceptual back
ground around which the activities of logistics revolve. The authors
retain their link-node approach to logistics as a framework for the
solving of temporal and spatial problems. Chapters 1 & 2 provide an
overview of the logistics discipline along with the role of logistics in
the firm. An appendix has been added to Chapter 2 covering the
basic concepts of distribution channels. Such an addition is appro
priate in light of the continuing trend toward integration of market
ing and logistics. Chapter 3 discusses the establishment of Customer
service in achieving buyer satisfaction while Chapter 4 examines the
supply side of logistics and materials management.
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Part II (Chapters 5-8) examines the functions which take place at
the nodes of a logistics system. The nature of inventory manage
ment and specific inventory decisions are covered in Chapters 6 & 7.
Improvements have been made in the discussion of both MRP and
JIT while an appendix dealing with special applications of EOQ re
mains for those wishing a little more depth. Warehousing decisions
are covered in Chapter 8 including a new section on third party
warehousing. Materials handling and packaging, discussed in
Chapter 9 could be improved with a more expanded coverage of
unitization. Part III (Chapters 9-11) examines the transportation
(link) element of logistics. Chapters 9 and 10 present an overview of
transportation modes and traffic management, including rates and
documentation. Much of the information from a separate chapter
on rates and tariffs in the third edition has been incorporated into
the chapter on traffic management. Chapter 11 is a new chapter
entitled "Strategic Transportation Decisions". While some of the
material contained in this chapter is not new (e.g. private carriage),
there is a good coverage of important general transportation strate
gies (e.g. reducing the number of carriers to build volume).
Part IV covers the broader decision areas of logistics. Chapter
12 is a new chapter which provides an expanded coverage of
international logistics including intermediaries, terms of sale and
documentation. Chapter 13 provides an introduction to the role of
logistics in making location decisions. The other new Chapter (14)
introduces logistics information systems and contains a good discus
sion of innovative information techniques (e.g. expert systems).
Chapter 15 and 16 examine logistics organizational structures and
strategic logistic planning. The text ends with the obligatory Chapter
(17) on future directions for logistics. Features retained from the
third addition include On-the-Line application examples (all new),
end of chapter questions, topic summaries within each chapter,
short cases for each chapter (about one half new), comprehensive
cases (all new), a bibliography following each part, a comprehensive
table of contents, and a glossary of terms. The short cases lend
themselves to some discussion but not to any formal case analysis.
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The four comprehensive cases do not deliver a promised opportu
nity to "view the entire logistics system". Perhaps one or two
longer, more integrative cases would be more appropriate. An
instructors manual is available which contains chapter objectives,
outlines, and answers to end of chapter questions along with
examination questions and additional cases. Finally, there is a
bibliography of logistics topics and a list of logistics information
sources. As is true with most "support" materials found for prin
ciples of logistics texts, while adequate, it does little to help the in
structor enhance the presentation of the subject. For example, the
case noted for all four comprehensive cases are less than two pages
long.
Introductory text books can always be criticized for their lack of
depth on any particular topic. For example, this text might be
improved with a discussion of forecasting and "partnerships" or
strategic alliances in logistics. However, the value of these texts lies
in their ability to provide an appreciation for the important role
played by a particular discipline (e.g. logistics) in the success of a
firm. From this perspective The Management of Business Logistics
succeeds in providing a well written overview for business students
in general and a good starting point for those wishing to pursue a
career in logistics.

Skip Sherwood
Professor of Logistics
California State University-Fresno
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TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT: PLANNING. OPERATIONS, AND
CONTROL; by John E. Tyworth, Joseph L. Cavinato, and
C. John Langley, Jr. (Addison-Wesley Publishing Company,
1987); pp. xiii, 514. $41.55. ISBN 0-201 -06504-5.

Here at last is a textbook treatment that brings the traffic
manager out of the cloistered world of rates, tariffs, and legal jargon
and places him/her in the modern corporate setting as a manager
planning, organizing and controlling major logistics functions from a
total cost perspective. Such a treatment is long overdue.
This is the first book of its kind to organize an examination and
analysis of traffic management around the broader conceptual
framework of the three basic functions of management: planning,
organizing, and controlling. Recognizing the legitimacy and the
importance of the traffic/transportation function and its management
in the modern industrial setting, this treatment seems to be quite
deserved and long overdue. Accordingly, the subject matter content
is logically divided into three basic parts, roughly corresponding to
these three key management functions. Moreover, this conceptual
approach lends itself quite well to the task of presenting traffic
management as a challenge to management creativity within the
dynamics of the current environment as opposed to traditional traffic
management as the conduct of a set of highly routinized, legalistic
duties in a more static environment. These authors have successfully
accomplished this task.
In the past, the relatively few books devoted to the subject of
industrial traffic management have stemmed largely from the
perceived demand for a compendium of information on procedure
and practice in traffic management which could serve as a handbook
for practicing traffic managers. Consequently, these books were
directed principally toward that purpose and tended to be merely
improvisations when an attempt was made to accomplish the
instructional objectives of a course in traffic management as a part of
a college curriculum in transportation and distribution studies. From
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this standpoint, the Tyworth, Cavinato, and Langley book comes
almost as a "breath of fresh air" to those seeking an effective
instructional tool for the more academic approach to traffic manage
ment as well as to nonacademic professionals who wish to more
accurately perceive the modern traffic management function in the
integrative systems perspective.
Another plus for those academicians looking for a better
teaching tool for courses in traffic management is the fact that the
authors have provided a comprehensive instructor's manual contain
ing subject matter outlines, examination questions with answers, and
a packet of transparency masters for classroom visual presentation of
key concepts and relationships. This obviously has resulted in a
more effective teaching instrument. The most important qualifica
tion here, perhaps, is the fact that the depth of the treatment is
pitched at a relatively elementary level for some college classroom
use. This, no doubt, reflects the intent of the authors to give the
book greater versatility and acceptability across a wider range of
curriculum designs in transportation and distribution studies and
need not be construed as a weakness. Those using the book in
curricula with greater depth of transportation and logistics offerings
may wish to upgrade the course content with supplementary materi
als.
Significantly, this book gives far better balance in meeting the
dual objectives of the student and the practitioner than previous
books and is far more reflective of the appropriate concerns and the
relevant approach to traffic management in the current environ
ment. In Part One, the authors pay due tribute to the legacy of tra
ditional traffic management by placing into proper perspective the
continuing significance of the remaining vestiges of such institutional
elements as legal and regulatory parameters and tariff pricing
systems. At the same time, this section opens a new vista by setting
into juxtaposition with the traditional the modern corporate role of
the traffic manager as it has evolved in the much more dynamic
environment following regulatory reform.

Volume /, Number I

109

In Part Two one finds the real "meat" of this work as the
authors present the management tasks of planning and organizing
the shipping firm's operations directed toward accomplishment of
effective and timely shipment. Not only are the traditional areas of
importance in traffic operations such as liability, claims management,
accessorial services, and terms of sale adequately dealt with, but
appropriate and timely attention is given to contract negotiation and
costing, shipment planning, fleet management, and international
shipping in keeping with the changed shipping environment.
Part Three with only two chapters dealing with management
control considerations is, perhaps, the weakest section of this book.
In regard to the subject matter presented here, though timely and
relevant enough, the scope and depth, nonetheless, hardly fulfills
the purpose that the book's auspicious layout might claim. The
information and electronic data transmission revolution with the
resulting opportunities and potential for facilitating the control
function in traffic management would seem to warrant broader,
more comprehensive treatment of this section.
Perhaps, the major distinction of this treatment, as compared
with the previous works in the area, is that the authors have suc
ceeded in portraying the traffic responsibilities in the modern firm as
comprising functions to be managed-not merely an array of duties
to be performed. Thus, if there were nothing more to recommend
it, the fact that this book has succeeded, through accurate portrayal
of the traffic management function in the modern logistics system
context, in deservedly elevating the traffic management function to
its proper status in today's corporate setting is sufficient credit to the
effort and intent of the authors. This should serve to enhance the
attractiveness of traffic management as a career objective for stu
dents of transportation and distribution.

James W. Adams
Associate Professor of Transportation
Auburn University
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HICHLIGHTS OF FUTURE ARTICLES
Claims Prevention
New Traffic Manager
Effects of Speed Limits on Schedules
A Profile of DNA Membership

SPECIAL ISSUE
A special issue of the journal of Transportation Management devoted to Air
Cargo will be published in 1991. This future publication is being made
possible as a result of a grant from Federal Express Corporation. Please
contact the editors or publisher for additional information.

FUTURE EVENTS AND ACTIVITIES
Delta Nu Alpha's 50th Anniversary will be celebrated in Philadelphia on
September 12-15, 1990 at the Fourth Annual Combined Education
Conference co-sponsored with the American Society of Transportation and
Logistics.
The 9th Annual Operation Stimulus will be held in Denver, Colorado on
February 2, 1990. Contact the Denver Transportation Club, Delta Nu Alph
or The American Society of Transportation and Logistics for additional
information.

Delta Nu Alpha

Transportation Fraternity

621 Plainfield Road • Suite 308 • Willowbrook. IL 60521
(708) 850-7100 • Fax (708) 850-7148

March 2,

1990

International Board

President

James D. Cobum
Logistics Management, Inc.
Centerville, OH
(513) 434-5963

Dear DNA Friend:
Enclosed is your copy of the JOURNAL OF
TRANSPORTATION MANAGEMENT.
It is always exciting
when you send out Volume I - Number 1!
The second
issue has returned from typesetting and is in the
process of being proofed at this point.
You can
expect to receive it by the middle of April.

Vice President/
Secretary Treasurer

Marilyn ft. Clore
ftress Corporation
Brimfield, IL
(309) 446-3395

Also enclosed is a copy of the Call for Papers
which was recently distributed to the academic
community regarding a special upcoming issue that
will be devoted to air cargo.
As you can see,
this anticipated publication is made possible as a
result of a specific grant from Federal Express.

Directors

ftenneth DeVries
THT Holland Motor Express. Inc.
Holland, Ml
(616)392-3101
newton A. Craves
Yellow Freight System, Inc.
Overland Park, ftS
(913) 345-3000

Please pass along
event any of your
suscribing to the
purchased for $25

Anthony F. Mancino
Associates Four Marketing
Holmdel, nj
(201) 290-0572

the subscription form in the
associates are interested in
publication.
Back issues may be
each.

Co-Editors David Bloomberg and Jerry Foster as
well as the Board of Directors will be interested
in your comments and suggestions.
Best regards.

Matthew V. Scocozza
The McHair Law Firm
Washington, D.C.
(202) 659-3900

Sincerely,

Administrative Office

Thomas W. Dardis
Mary' A. Haynes
(708)850-7100

Thomas W. Dardis
Executive Director

TWD:mh

International Education Committee

Dr. Jerry ft Foster, Director, University of Colorado, Boulder, CO 303-492-6166
David Fuller, Allied Bendix, Granger, in 219-237-2460
Diane Greenwood, Industrial Traffic Consultants, Longwood. FL 407-831-3466
Roy Johnson. Dillard Paper Co., Greensboro, HC 919-299-1211
Stephen O. Heal. Internal Revenue Service. Washington, D C. 202-566-6144

Delta. Nu Alpha

Transportation Fraternity

621 Plainfield Road • Suite 308 • Willowbrook, IL 60521
(708) 850-7100 • Fax (708) 850-7148

International Board

CALL FOR AIR CARGO RESEARCH ARTICLES
President

James D. Cobum
Logistics Management, Inc.
Centerville, OH
(513) 434-5963

Vice President/
Secretary Treasurer

Marilyn K. Clore
Kress Corporation
Brimfield. IL
(309) 446-3395

Directors

Kenneth DeVries
THT Holland Motor Express, Inc.
Holland, Ml
(616) 392-3101
newton A. Graves
Yellow Freight System, Inc.
Overland Park, KS
(913) 345-3000
Anthony F. Mancino
Associates Four Marketing
Holmdel, HJ
(201) 290-0572

As a result of a research grant provided by Federal Express
Corporation to the Delta Nu Alpha Foundation, a special issue of
the Journal of Transportation Management devoted entirely to the
air cargo industry will be published and distributed in March of
1991. Anyone interested in submitting an article regarding air
cargo should send it either to Dr. David J. Bloomberg or
Dr. Jerry R. Foster (addresses listed below) no later that
September 1, 1990.
Because of limited publishing space in JTM, expected interest in
this particular topic, and acceptance on a first-come, first serve
basis, early submission is suggested. If there are any question
regarding submission dates, writing style, or other matters, please
contact either Editor as soon as possible.

Sincerely,

Matthew V. Scocozza
The McHair Law Firm
Washington, D C.
(202) 659-3900

Administrative Office

Thomas W. Dardis
Mary A. Haynes
(708) 850-7100

David J. Bloomberg
Marketing, Finance and
Transportation Department
Western Illinois University
Macomb, Illinois 61455
(309) 298-1490

International Education Committee

Dr Jerry R. Foster, Director, University of Colorado, Boulder, CO 303-492-6166
David Fuller, Allied Bendix. Granger. IH 219-237-2460
Diane Greenwood. Industrial Traffic Consultants. Longwood, FL 407-831-3466
Roy Johnson, Dillard Paper Co , Greensboro, HC 919-299-1211
Stephen O. Heal, Internal Revenue Service, Washington, D C. 202-566-6144

Jerry R. Foster, Ph.D.
College of Business
University of Colorado
Boulder, Colorado 80309-0419
(303) 492-6166

Delta Nu Alpha

Transportation Fraternity

621 Plainfield Road • Suite 308 • Willowbrook, IL 60521
(708) 850-7100 • Fax (708) 850-7148

JOURNAL OF TRANSPORTATION MANAGEMENT
SUBSCRIPTION INFORMATION

(please print)
NAME:

_________________________________

ADDRESS:

FIRM:

_____________________________________

BUSINESS #:

(

)_

# OF SUBSCRIPTIONS: .
AMOUNT DUE:

$35

X

SIGNATURE

Please return this form along with your check (made payable to DNA) to
the Corporate offices at the above listed address.

